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ABSTRACT
FROM SPACE TO CYBERSPACE; A  REVIEW  OF THE 
CURRENT LITERATURE ON THE EM ERGING 
CYBERSPACE CULTURE AN D TH E W A YS IT EFFECTS 
THE HUMAN IDENTITY, EXPERIENCE AND INTERACTION
Zeynep Arda
M. F. A. in Graphic Design 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lewis Keir Johnson 
September, 2000
This work aims at describing the changing conditions for the human subject 
due to technology and more recently due to the information technology. 
Exploring the changing perceptions of self in the urban space and in 
cyberspace, the previously closed self, opens out losing its borders and 
merges with the milieu. Many authors define this alteration as a disorder, in 
literature a schizophrenic subject is brought about concerning the erasure of 
the boundaries that keep the identity distinct. Hence, today the human 
subject stands in a transition, in the middle of a journey that leads from space 
to cyberspace, from order to disorder, or from paranoia to schizophrenia; 
however from time to time departure becomes the destination again and 
again.
Keyw ords: City, cyberspace, order, disorder, paranoia, schizophrenia, 
fantasy, reality.
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ÖZET
KENT M EKANINDAN SİBERUZAYA: O LU ŞM AKTA OLAN 
SİBER U ZA Y KÜLTÜRÜ VE BU KÜLTÜRÜN İNSAN KİM LİĞİNİ, 
YAŞAN TISIN I VE İLETİŞİM İNİ ETKİLEM E 
ŞEKİLLERİNİN  İNCELENM ESİ
Zeynep Arda 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Lewis Keir Johnson 
Eylül, 2000
Bu çalışmada hedeflenen teknolojiye ve son yıllarda özellikle bilgi 
teknolojisine bağlı olarak değişen koşullarda insan kimliğinin nasıl 
değiştiğinin tanımlanmasıdır. Kişinin, kent mekanında değişen koşullar 
altında kendini algılamasını incelerken, elde edilen en önemli bulgu, daha 
önce tanımlı ve kapalı bir varlık olarak tanımlanan kimliğin, bugün 
sınırlarının erimesi ve içinde bulunduğu toplulukla bütünleşerek ayrı bir 
varlık olma tanımını kaybetmesidir. Günümüz literatüründe, pek çok yazar ve 
düşünür, bu değişikliği, bir bozukluk veya bir hastalık olarak adlandırmakta 
ve kimliği tanımlayan sınırların kalkmasıyla şizofrenik bir kimlik 
tanımlamaktadır. Böylece günümüzde, insan bir geçiş döneminde kalmakta, 
onu kent mekanından siberuzaya, düzenden bozukluğa, paranoyadan 
şizofreniye götüren bir yolculuğun ortasında bulunmaktadır. Ancak zaman 
zaman bu yolculukta varış noktası başlangıç noktasına, ya da başlangıç 
noktası varış noktasına dönüşmektedir.
A n ah tar Sözcükler: Kent, siberuzay, düzen, bozukluk, paranoya, şizofreni, 
hayal, gerçeklik.
İV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION i
2 REDEFINITION ON THE OUTSIDE 9
2.1 Technology and the City............................................................... 9
2.2 Changing Perceptions of the Urban Space................................. 24
2.3 Public Space..................................................................................55
2.4 Muteness: The Mute Individual of the City..............................63
2.5 From Paranoia to Schizophrenia................................................ 67
3 THERE IS A THERE THERE 87
3.1 Cyberspace Coming Up...............................................................87
3.2 Can Cyberspace Be a Public Space?..........................................97
4 VIRTUALITY IN FANTASY, FANTASY IN VIRTUALITY 121
4.1 Human Desire, Human Identity -  Delineating Fantasy.........121
4.2 Merits of Schizophrenia............................................................ 134
5 CONCLUSION 148
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Lonely Metropolitan, photomontage by Herbert Bayer (1931); rpt. 
in Gwen F. Chanzit, Herbert Baver: Collection and Archive at the Denver Art 
Museum (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1988) 71.
Figure 2. Ideal Man, by Leonardo da Vinci (1510); rpt. in Steen Eiler 
Rasmussen, Experiencing Architecture (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1959) 95. 
F igure 3. The eye of the Replicant, filmstill from Bladerunner (1982); rpt. in 
Scott Bukatman, Bladerunner (London: British Film Institute Modern 
Classics, 1997) 3.
Figure 4. The gridded space of New York (i960) Development Plans of New 
York from Museum of the City of New York; rpt. in Rem Koolhaas, Delirious 
New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan (New York: The Monacelli 
Press, 1994) cover.
Figure 5. Twentieth century New York (1976) photograph by Institute for 
Architecture and Urban Studies in New York, rpt. in Rem Koolhaas, Delirious 
New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan (New York: The Monacelli 
Press, 1994) 8.
Figure 6. Dystopia by firelight, filmstill from Bladerunner (1982); rpt. in 
Scott Bukatman, Bladerunner (London: British Film Institute Modern 
Classics, 1997) 15.
Figure 7. Model for a Glass Skyscraper, by Mies van der Rohe (1921); rpt. in 
O.B. Hardison, Jr. Disappearing through the Skylight: Culture and 
Technology in the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin Books, 1990) ill .  
F igure 8. Mirror Building, photograph by Stavros Moschopoulos, Image Ray 
(1988); rpt. in O.B. Hardison, Jr. Disappearing through the Skylight: Culture 
and Technology in the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin Books, 1990) 
141.
VI
Figure 9. The Cyborg Man, by Darrell Rainey (1988); rpt. in O.B. Hardison, 
Jr. Disappearing through the Skylight: Culture and Technology in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin Books, 1990) 323.
Figure 10. The Chatroom Bar Scene, by The Motion Factory (1996); rpt. in 
Steven Holtzman, Digital Mosaics: The Aesthetics of Cyberspace (New York: 
Simon&Schuster Inc., 1997) 33.
Vll
1. INTRODUCTION
I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space, that 
opens up behind the surface; ...a sort of shadow that gives my own 
visibility to myself there where I am absent...
Michel FOUCAULT
There has been a tendency to draw parallels between the city and the 
cyberspace -  or between the virtual space of computer networks and post- 
urban places of disorder and decay -  ever since William Gibson had 
published his science fiction novel Neuromancer and announced that the new 
informational network looked like Los Angeles seen from five thousand feet 
up in the air (Boyer 14). Gibson, with his abstract analogy not only 
introduced us to the spatial conception of the cyberspace; but he indeed 
coined the term cyberspace that turned out to be our new model for future 
possibilities in virtuality from 1984 onwards. It was again during this period, 
with the publication of Neuromancer “virtual reality” acquired a new name 
and a suddenly prominent conceptual identity as “cyberspace” (Stone, 1991: 
98).
In the era of Information Technology, the initial steps taken towards the 
interaction of people who are physically separated were the electronic 
versions of bulletin boards and the MUDs on the newly developing global 
network of the previous decades; given this basis for the possibility of 
sociality in virtual systems, the concept of cyberspace came and triggered the 
spatial ascensions to such human interaction. The first virtual communities 
based on information technology were the on-line bulletin board services 
(BBS) of the mid-1970s (Stone, 1991: 88). These BBSs were named after their 
perceived function -  virtual places, conceived to be just like physical bulletin 
boards, where people could post notes for general reading. After similar 
developments in the formation of virtual communities, there was a slight 
difference introduced by the Habitat designed by Chip Morningstar and 
Randall Farmer: Visual representations of the virtual communities. Habitat 
existed first as a mural located in a building in California, but, on-line, each 
area of the mural represented an entirely expandable area in the cyberspace, 
be it a forest, a plain or a city.
Habitat was actually inhabitable in that, when the user signed on, he/she 
had a window into the ongoing social life of the cyberspace -  the community 
“inside” the computer. The social space itself was represented by a 
cartoonlike frame. The virtual person -  the user’s delegated agency -  was 
represented by a cartoon figure which could be customized from a menu of 
body parts. When the user wished to speak through his/her virtual character, 
he/she would type the words on the keyboard and these words would appear 
in a speech balloon over the head of the user’s cartoon character. Thus
Habitat was a two-dimensional example of what William Gibson called a 
“consensual hallucination” (51).
Later with the publication of Neuromancer. the participants of the 
electronic communities that have learned to delegate their agency to body- 
representatives that exist in an imaginal space with representatives of other 
individuals, realized the further possibilities highlighted by the novel. In this 
sense, Neuromancer was not only signalling any technological development, 
but more importantly, it was crystallizing a new community. The three- 
dimensional inhabitable cyberspace described in Neuromancer does not yet 
exist, but the groundwork for it can be found in a series of experiments in 
both the military and private sectors.
In William Gibson’s words, cyberspace is defined to be:
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions 
of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught 
mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted 
from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable 
complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters 
and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding...” (51).
Considering the spatial conceptualization of virtuality; there are two main 
highlights to the issue. The urban decay of world’s greater cities today, raise 
doubts on the future of city as the space of human sociality in the decades to 
come; as is the case in Neuromancer and Ridley Scott’s cult science fiction 
movie Bladerunner (1982). Taking the dystopian point of view as suggested
by these two popular cultural artifacts, what awaits the inhabitant of urban 
settlements is pictured to be a ‘dark city’. For instance, in the post-nuclear 
holocaust Los Angeles of Bladerunner; seen through a dark filter of smog or 
persistently drizzling acid rain, in the murky streets clogged with a mass of 
isolated individuals, people not only lose the spatial dimension of urban life 
but also the effective means -  and even the desire -  to communicate with 
each other (Boyer 113).
Having this threat on one side; the other possibility that people would get 
jacked into the cyberspace, that the cyberspace would have a spatial 
configuration -  though as virtual as it can be -  exposes an escape from the 
reality just before our eyes. This idea of an escape that would relieve us off 
our places in actuality, and would allow us to step into a global network of 
social interaction where we might even leave our bodies behind and wear any 
body that we would rather have -  or any person that we would rather be -  
expands the commotion that we are already indulged in. Yet this kind of a 
cyberspace is defined again by Gibson, in both Neuromancer. where Case, the 
protagonist connects his nerves to the nervous system of another character, 
in order to have access to her thoughts, to see through her eyes, to hear 
through her ears; and in another novel by Gibson, in Mona Lisa Overdrive. 
the main character trying to solve a previous event that had taken place in the 
matrix, strives for answers within the matrix and is erased from the real 
world. This concept of escape actually suggests a debate of cities versus 
computer-generated cyberspace; or to put it more effectively: Real spaces 
versus the matrix of the computer system which is nothing more than a grid 
of zeros and ones. One important point is that this differentiation of real and
virtual spaces forms a great challenge for the way we perceive; offers us a new 
mode of perception. One fine example of this new mode of perception is in 
the opening sentence of Neuromancer; “The sl^ above the port was the 
colour of television, tuned to a dead channel.”
But concerning this point we were missing yet another: Isn’t the city a grid 
itself? This grid implies a wish for order. A potentiality... The point that the 
matrix of the computer system is nothing more than a grid of zeros and ones 
suggests that there is the same potentiality in both, in the sense that this 
“grid” imposes an order.
Drawing conclusions from the given commotion, at the turn of the twenty- 
first century, as the real life experiences in the urban space get less satisfying 
and more annoying, while the meaning of computer presence in people’s lives 
change for better or for worse; what comes out is a tendency to live a life in 
virtuality -  at least partially. One common way of explaining the changing 
inclinations is to say that we are moving away from the modernist culture 
towards a postmodernist culture (Turkle, 1997: 20) -  in the transformation 
of which we are suspended. The confusion with this transition arises in 
parallel with the difficulty of justifying the ‘reality’ within this new virtual life. 
Lagging behind the development paces of the computers, a decade ago people 
were just getting used to the idea that computers could project and extend a 
person’s intellect; however today people are “embracing the notion that 
computers may extend an individual’s physical presence” (Turkle, 1997: 20). 
So what we are experiencing today is a journey from the space as we know it, 
from our corporealities and physical identities; to a cyberspace which offers
US new opportunities, the newest of which is the flight from our bodies which 
might in the end come to mean a flight off of our real realities. As Sennett 
puts it; “As the reality people could believe in transformed itself into what 
they could immediately experience, a kind of terror about the immanent 
entered their lives” (Sennett, 1977:193).
Nevertheless there is another bisection to the issue at stake; considering 
the evidence for an uneasiness created of the identity of human being in the 
contemporary urban space, and the predictions of another uneasiness that is 
yet to come in the cyberspace. Besides the abundant literature on the 
‘disorders’ or the ‘diseases’ in the identity formation of the individual in our 
prominent culture, there is substantial discourse on worse to come with the 
new confusion. The loss of ‘physical’, the loss of ‘boundaries’ and the loss of 
‘limits to this loss’, makes stabilizing one’s identity an even more difficult task 
to accomplish once any possibility of a reference is gone. Yet, in this sense, 
what constitutes the similarity between the effects of the city -  the real space 
and the real life -  and the cyberspace -  the virtual -  on the identity of the 
person, in the form of a threat is highlighted by Stone: “The distinction 
between inside and outside has been erased and along with it the possibility 
of privacy” (1991:105).
Yet one has to draw the limits to the debate of identity at least. Yes, 
cyberspace is a new electronic, invisible space that allows the computer or the 
television screen to substitute for urban space and urban experience, or for 
the body and the bodily experience. It is a fact that the phenomenon of 
cyberspace creates an aggressive redefinition of the human condition, in that
the human subject is digitized and decentered and made invisible through the 
global stretch of cyberspace capillaries. The invisibility achieved by the newly 
proliferating electronic technologies of the Information Age forms a threat to 
the destruction of the concepts of space and time; as these new technologies 
are circulating outside of the human experiences of space and time, the 
notions of space and time are apt to change. But there is something almost 
uncanny in any description of “the virtual,” or in any other enthusiastic 
testimony that gives indirect references to what the new worlds of virtual 
reality is one day expected to provide -  or remove. This “uncanny” may 
perhaps be explained in terms of the changes of perception, taking the 
opening sentence of Neuromancer again, although still in its infancy, this 
postmodern technology already offers new modes of perception and opens 
new spaces for the imaginary. As Paul Virilio puts it, “cyberspace is a new 
form of perspective, it does not coincide with the audio-visual perspective 
which we already know” (i).
This developing pace of technology while transforming the urban space 
and the social space posits a new threat on the identity formation of the 
individuals, in its way of changing the daily life of the urban dweller and 
effecting the social relations created in the urban space. The more technology 
favors the imaginary instead of the s)nnbolic, and the cybernetic instead of 
the organic, the more human beings are confused in their search for a distinct 
identity. Fredric Jameson wrote in 1984, that in a postmodern world, the 
subject is not alienated but fragmented. He explained that the notion of 
alienation presumes a centralized, unitary self who could become lost to 
himself or herself. But if a postmodernist sees it, the self is decentered and
multiple, the concept of alienation breaks down. All that is left is an anxiety of 
identity. Thus in time, technological images become the Lacanian mirrors in 
which one looks for self-perception -  not being able to distinguish the 
borders of the self, one tends to attain a wholeness by identifying with the 
surrounding world of images.
Considering human interaction, be that in the city or in the cyberspace, 
the debate of disorder finds its justifications. There is no way to derive a 
simple conclusion out of this commotion and say that this era of transition, 
this era of suspension would come to an end by itself. Having lived through 
these eras of social interaction in the city -  in the real spaces of human life -  
confused with the possibilities and the impossibilities of these spaces and 
having undergone the processes of alienation, isolation and the evacuation of 
the concept of a “community” human beings would now attempt to try the 
opportunities of the virtual. In this sense, Neuromancer. in a single stroke, 
provided, through Gibson’s powerful vision for hackers, technologically 
literate and all the others involved, the imaginal public sphere and refigured 
discursive community that established the grounding for the possibility of a 
new kind of social interaction. However one can not conclude that what he 
proposes would be the way it is going to end, since from another point of view 
this is nothing more than progress and cyberspace does not give the human 
beings any more reality than they already have; so humanity would find a 
way out again and again...
2. REDEFINITION ON THE OUTSIDE
2.1 Technology and the City
“At that moment,” Iran said, “when I had the TV sound off, I was in a 
382 mood; I had just dialed it. So although I heard the emptiness 
intellectually, I didn’t feel it. My first reaction consisted of being 
grateful that we could afford a Penfield mood organ. But then I 
realized how unhealthy it was, sensing the absence of life, not just in 
this building but everywhere, and not reacting -  do you see? I guess 
you don’t. But that used to be considered a sign of mental illness; they 
called it ‘absence of inappropriate affect.’ So I left the TV sound off and 
I sat down at my mood organ and I experimented. And I finally found 
a setting for despair.” Her dark, pert face showed satisfaction, as if she 
had achieved something of worth. “So I put it on my schedule for twice 
a month; I think that’s a reasonable amount of time to feel hopeless 
about everything, about staying here on Earth after everybody who’s 
smart has emigrated, don’t you think?” (Dick, 5-6).
Hidden in the passage above is a mapping of the aftermath of technology, 
mutating the way people live and the way that they feel about it. It was with 
the increasing intimacy in the human-machine-computer relationship, 
growing detachment from the nature -  and from the space -  and at last the 
way human identity is altered under all this pressure exerted by the rapid
pace of technology that, despair was coined and a debate of disorder that 
evolved around human identity and human interaction in real and virtual 
spaces was initiated.
The secret of Philip K, Dick’s science fiction novel, Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? -  which gave further inspiration to the cult science fiction 
movie Bladerunner by Ridley Scott -  was its strong expression of the 
detachment of human beings from nature and the despair that had ascended 
about it. Today with the outburst of the concepts of cyberspace and virtuality, 
the despair gained yet another dimension; perplexed with the phantasmatic 
opportunities that these new conceptualizations of the future create, the 
human subject is looking for a new orientation in these virtual mazes. 
Nevertheless, technology strikes the urban space just the same and the 
individual of the city finds himself in a similar confusion, yet a confusion 
much older, which was at stake ever since technology took over the control of 
the development and expansion of the cities and buried the human scale, 
organic cities of the pre-industrial era deep in the dusty pages of history.
The vast literature on cyberspace that have accumulated ever since Gibson 
coined the term was, in this sense, nothing but a repetition, a recognition of 
the point, that the future might be clouded with a haze of despair rather than 
being enhanced with hope. What had less concerned the authors writing 
about cyberspace was that this despair involved a parallel detachment from 
the space -  the space that the human body inhabits and the space that 
defines the presence of the body in return. Cyberspace, in the sense that it 
creates a new virtual space in which to be, is considered by many to be a new
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phenomenon that might take us to places that we’ve never been to -  yet 
aren’t those places that we have traveled before but yet forgot? 
Oversimplifying the shift in imagination to the demands of technology, 
cyberspace promises nothing but a new hallucinatory space in which to be, 
an expansion of the human fantasy upgraded to a new level, but wasn’t it so 
for the space that we had known, wasn’t it yet a space that opened up to 
surround and embrace the fantasies of the human kind? If so, then, haven’t 
we “heard the emptiness intellectually” before, but resisted to feel it?
Thereby the phenomenon of cyberspace creates a further understanding 
of the way we relate to space be that real or virtual. In this sense, one further 
opportunity that cyberspace highlights, is to rethink and reconsider our 
positions with respect to technology and space with the help of the concept 
cyber-, and perhaps realize how “unhealthy” the conditions are for what we 
call human, if still, we do not realize further “the absence of life”.
Nevertheless with Gibson’s term cyberspace and his outstanding novel 
Neuromancer. the significant parallels between the cyberspace and the city 
space were highlighted. Gibson had drawn attention to these analogous 
spaces, as he expressed his observation of the similarities between the 
electronic circuits of the computer and the view of Los Angeles seen from 
5000 feet (Boyer 14). What he did was just to reduce the similarities to a 
congealed visual image, but yet as he triggered the analogy, he opened up a 
new space for our imagination, in which we would confront the potentiality 
that both the city and the cyberspace had -  the potentiality of imposing an 
order on the life and identity of the human subject. This analogy gave, on one
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hand, the possibility of evaluating what we have done so far with our real 
spaces before stepping into the virtual, and yet on the other hand, what the 
space had imposed over the human identity.
Another important reason why the city space was compared to cyberspace 
was the extreme thought that cyberspace had the potential to clone the world 
that we live in, simplify the world that we live in into a digital system of on 
and offs, reduce the spaces that we live in into a binary grid, create 
simulations of the world and more importantly, by means of such possibility, 
change our perceptions of space -  and of ourselves. Regarding the way 
cyberspace offers communication and sociality, the idea of communication as 
we had known it is shattered and there arises the possibility that the city is 
disappearing as the space of social interaction and that face-to-face 
communication -  already reduced to F2F in the cyberspace jargon -  is bound 
to evaporate.
Quoted by Holtzman in Digital Mosaics, the cultural critic William Irwin 
Thompson is preoccupied that the tales of virtual reality is the further 
elaboration of the American dream of escape from nature. In a vivid passage 
from his book The American Replacement of Nature, he colourfully animates 
what an escape from nature would be like:
In truth, America is extremely uncomfortable with nature; hence its 
culturally sophisticated preference for the fake and nonnatural, from 
Cheez Whiz sprayed out of an aerosol can onto a Styrofoam potatoed 
chip, to Cool Whip smoothing out the absence of taste in those 
attractively red, genetically engineered monster strawberries. Any
12
peasant with a dumb cow can make whipped cream, but it takes a 
chemical factory to make Cool Whip. It is the technological process 
and not the natural product that is important, and if it tastes bad, well, 
that’s beside the point, for what that point is aimed at, is the escape 
from nature. In America, even the food is a moon shot, a fast food 
rocket aimed away from Earth... History is replaced with movies, 
education is replaced with entertainment, and nature is replaced with 
technology... At the edge of nature in the farthest West of America, it is 
no accident that the final act in the American replacement of nature 
should be the replacement of the body’s incarnation into Virtual 
Reality (6o).
Even though the term that is being pronounced about cyberspace, 
“revolution” invokes and implies positive consequences for the future, the 
common dystopian view takes its leverage from the increasing detachment of 
the human being from the nature -  which has long been the case.
Donna Haraway, the famous author of “A Cyborg Manifesto”, begins the 
introduction of her book Primate Visions with the question: “How are love, 
power and science intertwined in the constructions of nature in the late 
twentieth century?” She, then goes on to ask:
What may count as nature for late industrial people? What forms does 
love of nature take in particular historical contexts? For whom and at 
what cost? In what specific places, out of which social and intellectual 
histories, and with what tools is nature constructed as an object of 
erotic and intellectual desire? [...] Who may contest for what the body 
of nature will be? (i)
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In Haraway’s account, these questions guide the history of popular 
cultures emerging from accounts of the bodies. Nevertheless, for many other 
authors, nature is already marked “dead” for the industrial people, and with it 
arose the necessity to ask what a new nature would be.
The ongoing debate about the detachment of human beings from nature, 
discussed vastly with respect to the industrial revolution, makes a new turn 
with the debate on cyberspace. Mark Slouka’s account on what the supporters 
of the new cyberization movement suggests drawing a new line in the human- 
nature-technology trio:
What do the digerati suggest? Not, as one might expect, an “enclosed, 
simulated reality” -  the standard vision of a virtual world apart -  but 
“a distributed, augmented reality... in which cyberization is integrated 
seamlessly into people’s everyday activities, and real-world objects 
take on virtual attributes and behaviors that support and enhance 
those activities.” In other words, a personalized universe. A universe 
in which “dumb” objects, “electrified with smartness,” entirely subject 
to our will, form a seamless web around us. In this new world, the 
environment will be both synthetic and eerily alive; the dividing line 
between “the born and the made” will blur. The couch will shrink out 
of the way like a dog to keep you from skinning your shins, while the 
cat in the corner will have a patent number on its skull, beneath its fur. 
Technology will become, as Allucquere Rosanne Stone has put it, the 
new “nature” we inhabit (66).
The matter of choice and control, over the construction and content of 
electronic communications recognizes the need to develop new modes of 
perception with which to receive, absorb, criticize, and produce new
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combinations of information. It examines the implications that the 
disappearance of reality as a referent and then the rise of the virtual entail.
Negroponte claims that “the world, as we experience it, is a very analog 
place. From a macroscopic point of view, it is not digital at all but continuous. 
Nothing goes suddenly on or off, turns from black to white, or changes from 
one state to another without going through a transition” (qtd. in Boyer 5).
If we take the issue with this assumption of a space of transition, for more 
and more we seem to experience the world as if framed by a digital box with 
binary on/off choices and disjunctions, with combinatorial lists and arrays, 
with encoded video games and program languages. If we draw an analogy 
between the computer matrix of data management and the city, then in 
Negroponte’s account it is precisely the “spaces of disjunction between the 
rows and columns of data entries that represent the forgotten spaces”, “the 
disavowed places” (10), and the bits eradicated because of the noise and 
redundancy they generate.
The form of the matrix brings to the city a systemic order that hides its 
heterogeneous nature and the disjunctive positions we hold within it. 
Paradoxically, while the analogy allows for the discussion of the 
disappearance of the city from our postmodern social and cultural agendas, 
the very immateriality of this electronic matrix and the world of virtual reality 
that it projects defies the grounding of that analogy. “And it is exactly this 
crossroads that should be explored: both the analogy between the computer 
matrix and the space of the city, and the moment of withdrawal or
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disappearance from the excesses of reality into the cybernetic representations 
of the virtual world of computers” (Negroponte qtd. in Boyer lo).
Many changes that await human beings in different fields of research, 
search for further possibilities to make the world a better place -  
nevertheless their outcomes work in reshaping the human condition as well 
as improving it. In an era where we are about to witness the complete 
resolution of the human DNA in benefit for the genome and the cancer 
research, our further findings might extend to experience human beings 
being cloned. The ongoing research on artificial intelligence might let us see 
machines sense and feel the way that we do in the coming decade.
Even further afield, the artificial intelligence theorist Hans Moravec 
calmly assures us that we are about to enter a “postbiological” universe in 
which robotic life forms capable of independent thought and procreation will 
“mature into entities as complex as ourselves.” Soon, he insists, we will 
download our willing spirits into computer memory or robotic bodies and do 
away with the weak flesh altogether.
Even more comes from K. Eric Drexler, the founding father of 
nanotechnology, who imagines the creation of self-replicating subatomic 
engines called nanomachines. In theory, these microscopic devices could 
slurp up oil spills or suck up toxic clouds; remove diseased DNA segments 
from the cells of AIDS patients, effectively curing them; or repair the ravages 
of normal aging at a cellular level, affording near immortality. For the 
moment, it is only the idea of such developments that cause the earthquake in
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our minds, albeit in no time it might become our reality. But for now we are 
stuck in this transition environment, learning to live with the idea.
The means of the human body in adjusting to the new transition 
environment, the new space in-between, whose limits have been drawn by the 
technology, be that the real or the virtual space; goes beyond simple 
corporeality to embrace a redefinition of the human body -  still on the basis 
of the Cartesian mind/body split. All the same this redefinition cyberspace 
suggests, is not that new, if we would just take one step (back) into 
postmodernism where the body had already been marked “absent” and 
perhaps it had always already been so. Disappearance of the body, defined 
with respect to the complex and multi-dimensional stimuli of the industrial 
capitalism had been declared and debated long ago -  if not for the sake of 
cyberspace, with respect to the telephone, television or all the other artifacts 
that have contributed to the construction of a network identity -  and the 
subject named “terminal of multiple networks”, and later the elaboration was 
to a “networked cyborg” with the embeddedness in the discourse of 
cyberculture (Baudrillard, 1983:128; Cubitt 134). Nonetheless, for the sake of 
tracing the steps from terminal of multiple networks to the networked 
cyborg, we might assume a transition, which describes the suspension of the 
body today.
This transition, this in-between space in which the body -  as the flesh and 
as the sine qua non of a human society -  is suspended, considering the issues 
of the city and the cyberspace, is best described by the concept of 
“heterotopia” introduced by Foucault, as defining places where incongruous
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things appear, in his discussion of utopias. Michel Foucault noted that there 
is a mirror standing between the utopian arrangements that have no real 
space but that reflect the society in either its perfected (utopian) or dejected 
(dystopian) state, and heterotopias that represent “other” spaces, spaces set 
up to counter arrangements or to offer compensatory places from those that 
exist in reality.
Discussed in Cvbercities by Christine Boyer, the concept of heterotopia 
introduced by Foucault clarifies the commotion that the body undergoes, lost 
in the transition between the mazes of the urban space and the ethereal of the 
cyberspace:
Foucault uses the body’s reflection in this mirror to help define this 
mixed-up, in-between space. This mirror is then a utopia, a placeless 
place where “I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual 
space, that opens up behind the surface;... a sort of shadow that gives 
my own visibility to myself there where I am absent...” But the mirror 
is also a real place, a heterotopia: “It makes this place that I occupy at 
the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, 
connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, 
since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point 
which is over there.” Thus at the center of any analysis of space and 
the body lies an illusion as to the constitution of the self, an illusion 
that endows the body with a false unity. In the mirror we find 
projected the rational self, privileged over the subjective emotional 
self. Here lies the basis for the Cartesian mind/body split which 
ascribes all things opposed to self-control, measurement, abstraction, 
or empirical verification to the feminized, sensual, inferior, or 
distrustful body. At the same time, however, Foucault’s mirror image 
paradoxically seems to imply that the self is both disembodied and
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embodied, both absent and present, both an unreal utopian and a real 
heterotopian projection (Boyer 78-9).
Thus in this remark, Michel Foucault reminds us that the self as a unity or 
whole may already be an illusion but also that the body is an inscribed 
surface o f events, while it has been constantly dismembered and disordered.
In its frozen movement, in its suspension, in its split, the body, 
overexposed to the technology, goes through similar processes of redefinition 
under the catalyzing forces of both the urban space and the cyberspace. The 
pathology of the real space versus the virtual appears to be in reshaping the 
“location” of the (human) body as well as the identity. As Holtzman 
emphasizes an escape from the body is always already a vicious cycle, since 
“the physical body always maintains its presence in the actual world” (47). 
And as Bruce Sterling suggests, our attempts of escape from the real world 
into the virtual lose meaning in that our jump off from our bodies is by no 
means a jump off of our imperfect human nature:
We do not understand how to live in cyberspace yet... We are feeling 
our way into it, blundering about. That is not surprising. Our lives in 
the physical world, the “real” world, are also far from perfect, despite a 
lot more practice. Human lives, real lives, are imperfect by their 
nature, and there are human beings in cyberspace. The way we live in 
cyberspace is a funhouse mirror of the way we live in the real world. 
We take both our advantages and our troubles with us (1992: xiii).
The point that a virtual world possesses a special quality of actual 
presence is yet to be covered, nevertheless the way technology had reshaped
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the cities is still an issue we cannot avoid but confront. One point Holtzman 
highlights about the virtual worlds is that they “only exist within the 
computer” (47), however it is not so for the transparent buildings, strips of 
unending highways or the huge masses of shopping malls that we spend our 
days in, which make us lose our orientations in the urban spaces we inhabit. 
Therefore, the way urban spaces have altered and the lucid effect of change 
on our perceptions is another issue that is worth considering before moving 
into the ethereal of cyberspace -  or, as Schaffner puts it, before we are “lost 
in cyberspace”.
Vicky Kirby, highlights yet another point considering the way we would 
construct the relation between the spaces that we live in and the notion of 
cyberspace, in her book Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, when 
she says, “...the notion of virtual reality takes its leverage from the material 
ground of actuality, from the palpable fact of the manifestly physical” (130).
This idea of passage, of suspension indeed takes its leverage from the 
material ground of actuality, from the physical, from the urban space again 
which enables “a ubiquitous feeling of being in all places while not really 
being anywhere” (Olalquiaga 2). This feeling of placelessness, of dislocation, 
is the basis on which the debate of disorder is predicated and which 
formulates the parallels between the city and the cyberspace in distorting the 
identity of human beings.
What is at stake is a reformulation of contemporary perception, due to 
high technology, and this reformulation is taken by Olalquiaga, to be one that
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imposes disorders on the human subject, mainly by blurring the distinction 
between temporal and spatial paradigms. Olalquiaga, takes psychasthenia, 
the psychological phenomenon in which being and surroundings fuse into 
one, to be exemplary of the experience of contemporary urban settings by 
human beings and, in parallel, she points to the association between the 
obsessive, compulsive disease, which is considered by many to be the “disease 
of the 1980s”, and the obsessive, paralyzing repetition; that is again an 
extension of the urban experience which replaces the temporal continuum. 
Not unrelated to the way Olalquiaga relates disorder to the perceptual 
changes that take place mainly in the urban space, is the urban space, the 
imposed order of the urban space, that sets up the trap for the human being 
and initiates the passage from order to disorder, from paranoia to 
schizophrenia. In the i8‘h century, before technology inhabited the city, the 
uneasiness on the human being was being a stranger to the crowd, the fear of 
the crowd and the paranoiac fear of the unknown, nonetheless the conditions 
have changed from pre-industrial to modern, from modern to postmodern, 
each phase defining the space and what it imposes on the individual -  if there 
still is one, each phase redefining the borders of the self. Today the borders 
have melted, and the fearful subject of the eighteenth century, has 
disappeared into the crowd, has become invisible and indistinguishable 
within the milieu of strangers he was once so fearful of.
Olalquiaga, then goes on to describe the postmodern condition that 
defines the uneasiness for the human being:
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Along with these perceptual changes, technology is gradually 
displacing the organic in favor of the cybernetic and the symbolic with 
the imaginary, producing a fragmentation of the self that is 
compensated in the intensification of pornographic and painful 
pleasures. Whether these processes help articulate a totalitarian 
politics of surveillance and control or its opposite, a subversive 
dynamic that trespasses boundaries and hierarchies, remains the 
foremost problem in the postmodern debate (i).
Her argument of uneasiness yet finds its justification again, in the 
criticism of modern architecture, in the urban space defined by particularly 
the monumental buildings of the “International Style”, but only for the 
modern subject, for things are rather different concerning postmodernity. Yet 
it was the attack of the modern , the world of order imposed by the modern 
that indicated an undercurrent for a paranoia, which was defined as 
“pathology of organization” (Baudrillard, 1983:132).
Instead of the rigid order, the postmodern body was surrounded and 
bombarded with incoherent fragments of space and time. For instance in 
Boyer’s conceptualization of a CyberCity, the body seemed to be continuously 
in motion - be it driving the freeways, shopping at the mall, or pushing carts 
through supermarket aisles -  but never in a continuum of either space or 
time. However, as it has previously been argued, in the reformulation of our 
perception of space and time, by means of electronic telecommunications, 
what we experienced was a loss of spatial boundaries or distinctions, so that 
all spaces began to look alike and imploded into a continuum, while time was 
reduced to obsessive and compulsive repetitions. For Olalquiaga, our 
experience of time was reduced to a process that resembled the obsessive-
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compulsive disease. Consequently, our new way of perceiving the new urban 
environment was an inability to map our contemporary terrain, to envision 
space and representational forms, and thus to weave things together, to 
conclude, to be able to act.
II....
Fig. 1. Lonely Metropolitan, photomontage, by Herbert Bayer (1931).
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2.2 Changing Perceptions of the Urban Space
All the benches are removed from the city, all fountains turned off, all 
flowers and trees are destroyed. Huge electric buzzers on the top of 
every apartment house (everyone lived in apartments) ranged the 
quarter hour. Often vibrations would throw people out of bed. 
Searchlights played over the town all night (no one was permitted to 
use shades, curtains, shutters or blinds).
No one ever looked at anyone because of the strict law against 
importuning, with or without verbal approach, anyone for any 
purpose, sexual or otherwise. All cafés and bars were closed 
(Burroughs 41).
This city of surveillance is not the case for the contemporary city, the way 
that Burroughs had defined it, but this feeling that arises out of this passage, 
the feeling of losing it, points to some part of ourselves that was in the city, 
but sank to an unknown with despair. The dark picture Burroughs draws is 
not the picture of our condition today, nevertheless it is the same cloud of 
despair that hangs over the city.
Space, as defined by human and as defining the human, gave the first 
signs to an uneasiness that probably began with an overexposion of the 
human subject to the technology, the technology that had developed further 
and further as did the human knowledge. In the undiminished challenge of 
confronting the nature, in the certain degrees of enlightenment that was 
achieved and that had triggered the human to accomplish more and more, 
the city was the membrane surrounding the delicate balances that the human
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sought to achieve in the effort that brought about the victories and defeats; 
while on the other hand it grew also from within with what was achieved -  or 
was lost -  and turned out to be the parade of human power and technology -  
versus nature; nevertheless being the disgraceful display of human failure. 
Hand in hand, technology and modern imposed their order on the city, under 
the mask of the grid, which had been the basis of the city plan ever from 
antiquity, with Hippodamus of Miletus. But this time, the grid expanded even 
to the third dimension defining a new topology of the urban geography 
surrounding the human subject.
The way that the city came up with the visualization of the human 
condition, brought about many other functions to the already multi­
functional space of human activity; to be the scene to define and display the 
human condition from the outside and from within; and from time to time, to 
be the mirror in which to recognize and redefine what is human. In 
Baudrillard’s view, however, even those days were gone, and the “all-too- 
visible” of the modern, had turned the city into a control screen, attenuating 
it to a “non-reflecting” surface of immanence (Baudrillard, 1983).
The grid provided, quite literally, the “common ground” on which the 
identification of the city space with the body -  the corporeal space -  could 
come about. This fantasy construction was inspired by a famous passage of 
architectural treatise, completed in about 1452, by Leon Battista Alberti, who 
had found that “The city is like a large house and the house like a small city”, 
but that in the end, “every edifice is a body” (qtd. in Bürgin 35). Alberti’s 
imagination of the corporeal city, predicated on his narrative on painting. De
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Pictura. which contained the first detailed description of the method of 
drawing a linear perspective.
In his description, the side of each square underlying the grid 
represented, as the unit of measurement, the braccio, equivalent to one third 
of the height of a standing man. Using this system for measurement, in a
perspective the accurate size of a
■ t *-»
figure could be determined 
relatively, at any point of the illusory 
depth of the represented space. By 
this means, the size of any building, 
or any other object could be 
determined with respect to this 
corporeal measure. Thereby, 
literally, man was the measure of all 
things. Nevertheless it was again 
with perspective, and in the light of 
this new perspective that man was 
represented and the human body as the origin of space, was swiftly replaced 
with the eye -  its disembodied metonymic representative (Bürgin 35).
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Fig. 2. Ideal Man, by Leonardo da Vinci (1510).
The human body reduced to the representativeness of the eye, has long 
been the case, and parallelly has long been the basis of an uneasiness that 
arises with it. The eye becomes the relation to reality, and visible becomes all 
that is real. The visible filled and conquered the everlasting space of the 
modern, until the day it was digitized to be represented as cyberspace, it still
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does in the presence of this new electronic space. Thereby, underlying the 
grid was the detachment of the 
self and the body. The subject 
“I” was always already 
transferred to the “eye”, the 
representative of the human 
body in place, in situ, before it
was delegated to any other “agent” out there in the nonplace. And in this way, 
man was already reduced to his image, which formed the basis for more 
uneasiness with the body to come with the concomitant eras.
Fig.3. The Eye of the Replicant. Bladerunner (1982).
The grid had another potentiality, that of imposing its order; while erasing 
the differences that existed on the surface. Its first appearance in the modern 
was in Baron Haussmann’s dreams of modern Paris, in i86os. His 
introduction of boulevards into the organic, historical fabric of Paris -  though 
not in the actual shape of a rectangular grid, but a radiant one -  was the first 
time implementation of the grid, lacerating the surface of differences as if to 
achieve neutrality and homogeneity.
Baron Haussmann’s remaking of Paris was simultaneous with the grid 
being imposed on New York by other planners. He was engaged in planning 
Paris during the era in which Central Park was created. Haussman 
confronted a congested city a thousand years old whose twisted streets were a 
breeding ground for, in his mind, the unholy trinity of disease, crime, and 
revolution. He imagined a traditional means of repression in face of these 
dangers. The cutting of straight streets through a congested Paris was to
27
make it easier for people to breathe, for police and if necessary, troops to 
move. The new streets of northeastern Paris were to be lined with apartments 
over elegant shops, in order to attract the bourgeoisie into previously 
working-class districts; he imagined a kind of internal class colonization of 
the city. At the same time that he opened the city mass transport to the swift 
flow of traffic, he also hoped the working classes were to become more locally 
dependent upon a new urban gentry; the Boulevard Richard Lenoir was built 
as such a street. Haussmann sought to create a Paris of steady if demanding 
customers, concierge-spies, and a thousand little services (Sennett, 1991: 62).
This was the first modern application of city planning in the sense that we 
know today, since city planning by specialists is a recent event in the history 
of cities. The reason for this is largely that, until the time of the great 
industrial cities, urban space and urban society was not considered as 
belonging to a special kind of social order. However, as industrial cities grew 
in population and economic importance, they came to be more uncontrolled, 
and rules of social welfare lost their historical power. The evils of this 
transformation are not unknown to us, the intense poverty, the uncertainty of 
health and vocation, the feeling of being locked up in the city (Sennett, 1996: 
87-8). So Baron Haussmann, in this point of view, was an enlightened man of 
his age, in his wish to rebuild Paris lay the impetus of changing the city for 
the better. In many senses he did, but only under the price of a subtle grid 
conquering the city space to effect it deeply in the centuries to come.
Paris at this time was a mosaic of the industrial and the pre-industrial 
orders. New factories were growing rapidly on the outskirts of the city and in
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certain sections of the inner city as well; but the tangle of small crooked 
streets and decaying buildings was still the focus for economic activities new 
and old, with a populace increasingly unknown to the administrative and 
social service authorities of the city. Movement within the city itself was very 
difficult -  in 1840 it took an hour and a half to walk on foot between two 
sections of Paris; the distance can now be navigated on foot in thirty minutes. 
Especially frightening to the political authorities was the fact there was no 
way of controlling the workers in case of civil insurrection, since the twisted 
streets were perfect for setting up impromptu barricades. Haussmann began 
to cut, through the jumble of streets, great, long, unswervingly straight 
avenues, avenues that could accommodate an enormous amount of traffic, 
serve as an easy means of getting troops into riotous sections of the city, and 
act like river boundaries dividing different socioeconomic sections of the city 
(Sennett, 1996; 88-9). Thus the urban space possessed a new face, that of the 
modern, which looked at the public as a mass to be ordered and organized.
At about the same time the grid took over New York, though it is one of 
the oldest cities in America, New York’s planners treated it during the era of 
high capitalism. It was treated as if it were a city on the frontier, a place 
required to deal with the physical world as an enemy. Under the objectives of 
the plan blinked an aggression against the environment; which was not 
displayed explicitly, nonetheless could not be hidden. The planners imposed 
a grid at one blow in 1811 upon Manhattan from Canal Street, the edge of 
dense settlement, up to 155^  ^ Street, and then in a second stroke in 1870 to 
the northern tip. They imposed the grid more gradually in Brooklyn east from
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Fig. 4. The gridded space of New York (1960). Development Plans of New York from the Museum of 
the City of New York.
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Fig, 5. Twentieth Century New York (1976).
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its old harbour (Sennett, 1991: 52). And, inexorably, development according 
to the grid did abolish whatever existing settlement was encountered. Or in 
other words, planning New York was the ultimate exercise of displaying the 
power of technology over nature and on the built environment. The victory 
lay in creating a surface from an urban land containing enormous variety, 
neutralizing it.
Neutrality, as a space of social control, seems in this way to explain a great 
divide between nineteenth century European planning and those more 
modern practices that first took shape horizontally in nineteenth century 
America and are now more universally, vertically deployed (Sennett, 1991: 
62). American urbanism during its great flowering has proceeded by another 
path of power, one that repressed the overt definition of significant space in 
which domination and dependence were to occur. There is no building form 
like Haussmannian apartment house with its service web. Instead both 
horizontal and vertical development proceeded among us as a more modern, 
more abstract operation of extension. In the making of the grid cities “new” 
Americans proceeded as in their encounters with uative Americans by 
erasure of the presence of an alien Other rather than by colonization. Instead 
of establishing the significance of place, control operated through 
consciousness of place as neutral.
Gridded space does more than create a blank canvas for development. It 
subdues those who must live in the space, but disorienting their ability to see 
and to evaluate relationships. In that sense, the planning of neutral space is 
an act of dominating and subduing others.
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The twentieth century, however, also deploys the grid. It is vertical and 
more universal; it is the skyscraper. The older geographic modes reappear in 
this architectural form. More, it is in the building of skyscrapers that the 
cracks became evident in the edifice of neutralizing power.
In cities of skyscrapers, Hong Kong as much as New York, it is impossible 
to think of the vertical slices above street level as having an inherent order, 
like the intersection of cardo and decumanus; one can not point to activities 
that ought particularly to happen on the sixth floor of buildings. Nor can one 
relate visually sixth floors to twenty-second floors as opposed to twenty-fifth 
floors in a building (Sennett, 1991: 57-60). Nor do skyscrapers have the 
necessary height. The vertical grid lacks definitions of both significant 
placement and closure.
It was under this definition of grid that the binary grid of the invisible of 
cyberspace was undertaken. The grid as apparent in the case of cyberspace 
was an act of appearing and disappearing at the same time. In her attempt to 
delve into the plus effect - the burden or the relief -  of what the 
conceptualization of cyberspace, or virtual reality, brought to the already 
confused individual; Vicky Kirby defines the current situation to be an 
“exemplary of [the] incessant and aggressive redefinition of the human 
condition” as the “human subject is now digitized and decentered through the 
global stretch of cyberspace capillaries.” Her position is one of discerning the 
dark side of an enlightenment, that took place - and is taking place -  which 
“extends to the larger and not unrelated question of what it means to be 
human” (129).
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The dark side to an enlightenment, which had for the most part, 
contracted “a new Cartesian -  Lockean -  Kantian subject through a happy, 
progressive marriage of self, reason , and technology” was previously 
perceived by Guy Debord -  as by many other philosophers - who saw the very 
first symptoms in the great cities of his era (Derian, Introduction 3). To 
Debord, the reduction of life to the spectacle, was the reason that the city 
took over from being the display of the visions of life, to being the scenery, 
the image, the representation which previously was life itself:
In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life 
presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything 
that was directly lived has moved away into a representation (1).
His influential expression of lives being visualized rather than lived, lead 
the way to the realization of the “powers of the eye”, as well as to a dystopian 
view of the future of humanity. On the threshold of postmodernity, that 
aimed at the destruction of the modern order, many were altered, the 
spectacle replaced by transparency and obscenity, as we approached science 
fiction gradually (Baudrillard, 1998).
Science fiction was the most powerful media in which this view was 
conveyed, beginning from very early examples of the notion in science fiction 
novels, later with an even stronger expression in science fiction movies. Very 
commonly, science fiction movies took the city to be the “dark scenery” of the 
dark future that they represented, as the “darkness” of the city enveloped and
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multiplied the dystopic view. Never in the science fiction movies was the sky 
over the city a bright blue.
Even in a very early example of the science fiction genre, in “The Machine 
Stops” by Edward Morgan Forster dated 1909, the extreme of losing the sense 
of space, and the sense of our body as the origin of space was the core of the 
novel. A dystopic nightmare fully worthy of Orwell, “The Machine Stops”, 
opens in “a small room, hexagonal in shape, like the cell of a bee.” The 
woman who lives in this room, Vashti, shops by phone, orders food by phone, 
gives lectures to an audience she can see and hear without leaving her room. 
She’s pathologically afraid of direct experience. In her world, direct 
observation, physical space, the unmediated event have all been banished. 
Her room -  an underground bunker linked to others through a sort of 
computer, fully equipped to compensate for the outside world -  is a self- 
enclosed universe: “though it contained nothing,” Forster tells us, “it was in 
touch with all that she cared for in the world.” Nature has been removed from 
human life. “She made the room dark and slept; she awoke and made the 
room light; she ate and exchanged ideas with her friends, and listened to 
music and attended lectures; she made the room dark and slept.”
Into this self-enclosed world, through his image that appears on a blue, 
TV-like plate, comes Vashti’s son, Kuno, a rebel, a malcontent, who lives in a 
room just like hers in the Southern hemisphere. “I want you to come and see 
me,” he says. Vashti, at first, doesn’t understand. “But I can see you,” she 
protests. Kuno, however, doesn’t want to see her through the offices of the 
machine. Absurdly, he wants more. “I see something like you in this plate,
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but I do not see you,” he says. “Pay me a visit so that we can meet face to face, 
and talk about the hopes that are in my mind.” Eventually, though already 
anticipating “the terrors of direct experience,” Vashti agrees to go. Face-to- 
face with his mother, Kuno tells her of his crime. In this Age of the Machine, 
in which direct experience has been demonized and the natural world 
rendered obsolete, Kuno has been to the surface. His rebellion knows no 
bounds: “We say space is annihilated,” he argues, “but we have annihilated 
not space, but the sense thereof. We have lost a part of ourselves.” Kuno -  
young, aggressive, curious -  is determined to recover the physical world. 
“Man is the measure,” he claims, to his mother’s horror. “Man’s feet are the 
measure for distance, his hands are the measure for ownership, his body is 
the measure for all that is lovable and desirable and strong.” In spite of 
Forster’s strong vision, Kuno’s words seem only a naive cry, considering what 
we have undergone all through the twentieth century.
Portrayed in the movies and attributed to the city, was not only the dying 
hopes of saving the urban spaces in any conceptual or physical sense, but also 
the uneasiness that the human subject lived through, deriving from his 
interrelation with the space, his interrelation within the space, with himself 
and with the other. Or repeating Philip K. Dick’s words, what was at stake for 
the human subject was “sensing the absence of life” and “not reacting”. 
Boyer’s comment on Bladerunner, clarifies this point of losing contact:
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Los Angeles in 2019 reflects a post-industrial, post-nuclear-holocaust, 
decomposed, disintegrated, and decayed city where technological 
systems have gone awry. Seen through a dark filter of smog or 
persistently dripping acid rain, its small-scale street markets and low- 
ceilinged malls give the appearance of a labyrinthine underground 
enclosure choked with refuse. All of the vendors in these crowded 
street markets, as well as the individually subcontracted 
manufacturers of eyes or various other body parts, are third-world 
Asian immigrants whose language is “city-speak,” a meltdown of 
English, Japanese, Spanish, and other vocabularies who no longer 
have the effective means or even the desire to communicate with each 
other (113-4, [emphasis mine]).
Fig. 6. Dystopia by firelight. 
Bladerunner (1982).
What was the reason for this dystopic view? On behalf of the city, the 20‘h 
century had begun with great innovations and inventions besides the urban 
utopias that have configured “civilized” urban settings for the future of 
human communities. Reported by Robert Fishman in “Urban Utopias in the 
20‘h Century”, the search for the ideal city of the 20‘*^ century involved the 
description of “the city that best expresses the power and beauty of modern 
technology and the most enlightened ideas of social justice” (19 [emphasis 
mine]). Between 1890 and 1930, three names, Ebenezer Howard, Frank 
Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier came up with plans for ideal cities that
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included detailed plans for factories, office buildings, schools, parks and 
transportation systems, all integrated into a revolutionary restructuring of 
urban form. Having pulled the trigger for ideas underlying the modern city, 
these men devoted themselves to passionate and unremitting efforts to make 
their ideal a reality, however reality did not turn out to be what they had 
planned.
This was exactly the point that Jane Jacobs attacked, in her book The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities in 1960s, the “megalomania” of 
architects like Le Corbusier, who sought to sweep away, with a single stroke 
of pen, a thousand years of dense urban settlement and many others who 
thought they would design the social life of the city with their plans for the 
physical design of the city. To Jane Jacobs, however, it made more sense that 
the viability of urban forms that have accumulated over time from local uses 
and historical changes were used to create a socially legitimate and 
democratic urban space, instead of order that the “artist-designer-dictator” 
imposed (ill).
This attack had deep roots in the history of the city and was brought about 
centuries ago by Aristotle, concerning the ancient world. The grid of the city 
imposed by Hippodamus of Miletus, who is considered to be the founding 
father of urban design and city planning, was the basis of Aristotle’s 
argument. Aristotle saw the grid model as weakening the interaction of 
citizens, as the arbitrary creation of an order blocked the citizens’ learning 
from mutual conflict how to live together (Sennett, 1994: 59). The grid in
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Aristotle’s view, was much different from the grid of the modern, for it 
involved a closure as well as order.
The Egyptian hierograph that the historian Joseph Rykwert believes was 
one of the original signs for a town is described as a “nywt” (192). This 
hierograph, a cross within a circle, suggests two of the 
simplest, most enduring urban images. The circle is a 
single, unbroken closed line: it suggests enclosure, a wall or 
space like a town square; within this enclosure, life unfolds.
The cross is the simple form of distinct compound lines: it is perhaps the 
most ancient object of environmental process, as opposed to the circle, which 
defines the boundary defining environmental size. Crossed lines represent an 
elemental way of making streets within the boundary, through making grids, 
the decumanus and the cardo in the Roman city. Thereby the grid was an 
expression of culture, as was first perceived by Hippodamus of Miletus, and 
the intersection of the crossed lines, the center of the settlement, the city, 
civilization and life.
The grid, like any design can become whatever particular cultures makes 
it represent. If it was perceived to be an emotionally charged design in the 
ancient world, the Americans were the first to use it for a different purpose: 
to deny that complexity and difference existed in the environment. Thus the 
grid was used in modernity as a plan that neutralizes the environment, it was 
solid disavowal.
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The twentieth century completed both these geographic processes at work 
in the making of grids, even when development occurred by building a 
thousand houses along arbitrarily twisting streets, or by digging out lumps of 
industrial park, office campus, and shopping mall on the edges of highways. 
In the development of the modern “megalopolis” it became more reasonable 
to speak of urban nodes than of centers. The very vagueness of the word node 
indicates the loss of a language for naming environmental value: center is 
charged with meanings both historical and visual, while node is resolutely 
dull (Sennett, 1991: 46-50).
Nevertheless the act of imposing the grid of modernity on the city was 
performed and the shift in imagination and in actuality, from urban utopias 
to urban dystopias pictured as such, was mainly embedded in the way our 
perception of the urban space altered according to the grid. The grid worked 
in transforming a livable urban setting to a neutral surface, or in other words, 
it was reducing the space of the imaginary to a surface of immanence.
In achieving the mutual conflict of living together, the city was first the 
stronghold of civilization, which in turn, showed up ironically, as the first 
concrete bastion of escape from nature. In the unending human challenge 
against the nature, civilization and technology played the lead, while the city 
provided the perfect scenery for the battle. Remaining as a larger settlement, 
where people sought to find better ways of mutual life, revolutions stroked 
the human of the city, and when the magic wand of technology touched it, 
with it began the process that gave the cold face of technology that alienated 
people from the space and later with high-tech, urban space assumed a face
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that the human could no longer recognize. As materials for culture, the stones 
of the modern city seemed badly laid by planners and architects. Different 
conceptualizations of the grid, became apparent with the shopping mall, the 
parking lot, the apartment house and the elevator -  as the object of the three- 
dimensional grid -  did not suggest in their form the complexities of how 
people might live. What once were the experiences of places appear now as 
floating mental operations.
Along with the alienation from the space of civilization, soon the human 
was even an alien to his own body -  the body o f technology. It was in the 18^  ^
and the 19^  ^centuries that the human communities had undergone the effects 
of the industrial revolution, followed by the invention of computer in the 20^^^ 
century, and today even a “cyberspace revolution” is pronounced. As Slouka 
argues in the War of the Worlds. “The cyberspace revolution” seeked to erase 
the world “as we had known it” (22).
Realizing the potence of the rapid developments in computer technology, 
Alvin Toffler wrote early in 1980s that there is a “Third Wave” coming up and 
that “humanity faces a quantum leap forward.” To Toffler, the “Third Wave” 
meant “the deepest upheaval and creative restructuring of all time.” It was a 
wave both in the sense that it would clear away history, and us, human 
beings would be engaged in “building a remarkable civilization from the 
ground up”; and that it would all be so rapid that it would be done away with 
our civilization by the time we realize it:
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Until now, the human race has undergone two great waves of change, 
each one largely obliterating earlier cultures or civilizations and 
replacing them with ways of life inconceivable to those who came 
before. The First Wave of change -  the agricultural revolution -  took 
thousands of years to play itself out. The Second Wave -  the rise of 
industrial civilization -  took a mere hundred years. Today history is 
even more accelerative, and it is likely that the Third Wave will sweep 
across history and complete itself in a few decades (lo).
Although some chances of cyberspace being assimilated -  as did many 
other innovations -  is also pronounced by many authors who claim that it 
could never replace the pleasures of the real experiences, there is evidence 
that it might reshape our ‘real’ instead of replacing it;
There is another fact about cultural innovations. If an innovation is 
basic, simply because it is so, a generation after it has been introduced, 
it becomes part of the world as given -  part of the shape of 
consciousness, you might say, rather than the content of 
consciousness. Television seemed to the generation of the 1940s to be 
an amazing triumph of human ingenuity and pregnant with social 
implications. Its influence on modern culture has been every bit as 
great as those who witnessed its birth imagined. But now that it has 
been assimilated, it is taken for granted, which means that, in a sense, 
it has become obvious and invisible at the same time. Anyone who 
discusses modern culture has to do a great deal of contemplating of 
the invisible in the obvious (Hardison xii-xiii).
Oversimplifying the visual of the city, this was indeed the core of the 
changing perceptions of the urban space, the technology and the grid that it 
imposed on the city, became “obvious and invisible at the same time”. Or, in
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other words, it was the invisibility of the all-too-visible in the urban space 
that had changed the way we perceived and experienced it.
Richard Sennett considered, in his article “The Powers of the Eye”, the 
way our perception has been altered by his emphasis on the effects of the 
modern urban geography on the body’s sensations of motion, sight and 
touch. His account is very much effected by the point that our urban 
experiences are now presumably reflections of our altered reality, as he noted 
earlier “As the reality people could believe in transformed itself to what they 
could immediately experience, a kind of terror about the immanent entered 
their lives” (Sennett, 1977:193).
His concern was mainly the impact of modern city planning and urban 
design however, the modern architecture and then, the postmodern 
architecture also had their share in the way the human subject of the urban 
geography changed his/her perception of the actual space. In 1932, an 
exhibition of modern architecture was held in the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York. The exhibition was largely a tribute to the Bauhaus movement, 
nevertheless the style that the exhibition revealed was identified by Philip 
Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock as the “International Style” (Hardison 
100).
This phrase. International Style, was considered to be “a stroke of genius,” 
because it expressed the universalizing thrust -  the push away from local 
attachments -  of the new architecture (Hardison 100). Although the features 
of this culture were appearing first in technologically advanced societies,
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principally Europe and North America, the new culture would be 
transnational and transregional. It would be international because it would 
draw on the aesthetic of technology, not the “grab bag of styles” produced 
over the centuries by the different historical circumstances of different 
countries and regions (Hardison loi).
The fact that the International Style was enormously successful, the fact 
that it became the standard design for an enormous range of buildings from 
the most elegant to the most slipshod, is an index of the practicality of its 
original concepts. Between 1945 and 1970 the International Style swept all 
competition aside. Hotels, motels, office buildings, factories, museums, 
private houses, department stores, hospitals, low-cost housing developments 
-  in short, every imaginable sort of building -  testify to its impact. The 
International Style is not only international in the sense of being abstract 
rather than historical, but also in the sense of being worldwide. Low-cost 
housing and public-housing projects from Singapore to Hong Kong to 
Hamburg to Chicago demonstrate that it can be cheap and modular as well as 
expensive and heroic. The best known American examples of the 
International Style are strongly geometric and heroic in size.
The use of reflective glass was primarily functional, in buildings that were 
exemplaries of the International Style, especially in the American Southwest 
and South, because it reduced heat radiation into the buildings. However, the 
primary objective was beauty, not efficiency. In good buildings the effect 
simplified the structures, getting rid of the busy reticulations of earlier
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Fig. 7. Model for a Glass Skyscraper, by 
Mies van der Rohe, (1921). An early 
experiment with the cylinder in contrast to 
the rectilinear geometry more typical of the 
Bauhaus and the International Style.
Fig. 8. Mirror Building. Typical of the 
surreal imagery created by the façades of the 
buildings covered by reflective glass. (1988).
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International Style buildings. The squares and rectangles were replaced by 
gigantic mirrors reflecting surrealistic variations of the surrounding activity.
Human beings floated across these mirrors like bubbles in an oversized 
Wurlitzer jukebox. The buildings themselves seemed only half real. 
Sometimes they were brilliantly there -  great rectangles and cylinders of 
reflected light. At other times they were almost invisible because when they 
were looked at they blended into the scenery.
When they were not disappering, these buildings asserted by their 
geometries that they were rigid and that their basic structural principle was 
compression, the piling of one column on another. The movement that 
rippled across their surfaces intensified the impression that they, themselves, 
were static. Nevertheless, they implied the playfulness of the modern 
aesthetic, which was their most striking -  and also their most serious and, by 
corollary, their most disturbing -  feature.
The playfulness imitates the playfulness of science that produces game 
theory and virtual particles and black holes and that, by introducing human 
growth genes into cows, forces students of ethics to reexamine the definition 
of cannibalism. The importance of play in the modern aesthetic should not 
come as a surprise. It is announced in every city in the developed world by 
the fantastic and playful buildings of postmodernism and neomodernism and 
by the fantastic juxtapositions of architectural styles that typify collage city 
and urban adhocism.
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In Burgin’s account, one of the most visible images of the modern 
dialectic of interior and exterior is the wall of steel and glass, of which the 
glass and iron structures of the Paris arcades are a prototype. He considers 
the specific example of the Administrative Office, for a model factory 
complex, built by Walter Gropius and Adolf Meyer for the Werkbund 
exhibition in Cologne in 1914. The Administrative Office building, as Sennett 
has described it, was an outstanding example of one, where the confines of 
the interior have lost their meaning: “...in this building you are 
simultaneously inside and outside. ... From the outside you can see people 
moving up and down between floors.... You can see through the walls, your 
eyes move inside to outside, outside to inside.” Thus, Burgin notes, “...the 
metaphor of porosity competes with a dialectic of interior and exterior which 
belongs to a different register. This ambivalence marks the representational 
space of modernism in general” (36).
Today postmodern culture includes the geometries of the International 
Style, the fantasies of façadism, and the gamesmanship of theme parks and 
museum villages. It pretends at times to be static but it is really dynamic. Its 
buildings move and sway and reflect dreamy visions of everything that is 
going on around them. It surrounds its citizens with the linear structure of 
pipelines and interstate highways and high-tension lines and the delicate 
virtuosities of the surfaces of the Chrysler Airflow and the Boeing 747 and the 
lacy weavings of circuits etched on silicon, as well as with the brutal 
assertiveness of oil tankers and bulldozers and the Tinkertoy complications of 
trusses and geodesic domes and lunar landers. It abounds in images and 
sounds and values utterly different from those of the world of natural things
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seen from a middle distance. But the way it included play is by no means, to 
help the human subject in overcoming any uneasiness that s/he had 
undergone. In Hardison’s words, “it is a human world,” but one that is 
human, “in ways no one expected” (145).
Thus far, the new architecture that involves transparent façades, semi­
open spaces and skylights causes an uneasiness on the individual’s 
experience of the urban space, the sense of space or enclosure is totally lost 
and the individual is left in a maze of transparencies which emphasizes what 
is hidden more than that is displayed. Nonetheless, Novak makes similar 
indications, in his concept of “liquid architecture”:
The city, traditionally the continuous city of physical proximity 
becomes the discontinuous city of cultural and intellectual community. 
Architecture, normally understood in the context of the first, 
conventional city, shifts to the structure of relationships, connections 
and associations that are webbed over and around the simple world of 
appearances and accommodations of commonplace functions (249).
The unceasing feeling of ‘being lost’ in the freedom of the new conception 
of space leads to yet another sense of loss: There is a feeling of having been 
robbed of time in the space of transparencies and multiplications. In the 
repetitive pattern of the urban daily life, one feels as if time had shrunk and 
everyday is lost to the urban rituals instead of the bodily pleasures it might 
have included. Coming to the Wonderland comparison suggested by 
Olalquiaga, the city is becoming yet another place where reality and 
appearance merge into one.
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As discussed by Sennett in “The Powers of The Eye”, the changing urban 
space has its way of deadening our bodily sensations and reducing them to a 
rapid cycle of appearances and disappearances, or in the context delineated 
by Negroponte previously, digitizing the space, reducing it to ons and offs. 
The human subject wanders in this three dimensional grid, floats, appears 
and disappears.
In the early eras of the modern, Benjamin had drawn an analogy of the 
film to account for the changing perceptions, mainly focusing on the 
descriptions of the crowd, in “The Man of the Crowd” by Edgar Allen Poe:
Whereas Poe’s passers-by cast glances in all directions, which still 
appeared to be aimless, today’s pedestrians are obliged to do so in 
order to keep abreast of traffic signals. ... Thus technology has 
subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of training. There 
came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was met by the 
film. In a film, perception in the form of shocks was established as a 
formal principle. That which determines the rhythm of production on 
a conveyor belt is the basis of the rhythm of reception in the film. ... 
Poe’s text makes us understand the true connection between wildness 
and discipline. His pedestrians act as if they had adapted themselves 
to the machines and could express themselves only automatically. 
Their behaviour is a reaction to shocks. “If jostled, they bowed 
profusely to the jostlers” (132-133).
Even more of uneasiness comes from the motion attained in the industrial 
city due to the automobile, as motion reduces the urban journeys to journeys 
through space instead of journeys in space, meanwhile reducing the 
perception of space as space:
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People experience speed today in terms people in the past could hardly 
conceive. The technology of motion has changed modern geography; 
thanks to the power of human speed, human settlements have 
extended beyond tight-packed centers out into peripheral space.
Yet speed is a very curious phenomenon. For one thing, anxiety about 
moving has developed in the same measure as the ability to move fast; 
people become uneasy if a subway stops for half a minute, and traffic 
jams bring out the beast in even the most sedate bourgeois. ... The 
desire for speed has in turn a marked effect on one’s sense of space. 
The moving body does not want to be arrested in space, it seeks pure 
forward thrust. This dissonance between speed and space again 
contrasts to earlier eras. For instance, the “Villes Circulatoires” of the 
eighteenth century sought to organize a city so that people could 
circulate efficiently through it yet experience its monuments, 
churches, and parks as pleasurable elements in the process of 
moving... as a journey in space, the course of the journey as significant 
as its origin and its destination (Sennett, 1994: 61).
In this consideration motion and speed are blamable, for the urban space 
becoming a land of complex and perpetual geography of movements 
abstracted from space, nevertheless no longer as space that is experienced as 
space. The streets of the flâneur, becomes streets for the machine, a street is 
the runway for speed and motion now, emptied of street life and the public 
carved within.
The speed of daily life, both in the sense of speed attained by the body 
moving around in its automobile armour, and the speed of the perception 
process in the urban environment becomes a perplexing aspect of the urban 
space, a threat for the individual completing his/her identity formation. In 
this context, the distinctions that define the identity of the individual in space
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as the individual are so blurred that the merging of reality and appearance is 
inevitable as well as a threat to identity formation. The reality of perception is 
more a reality of rapid snapshots of ‘appearances’ rather than a gaze. And the 
city becomes an envelope of the landscape of human silences -  but not the 
space of social interaction anymore. As Bürgin reminds us:
[A]s much as modernity is the locus of transparency in architecture, it 
is also the at the origin of the social isolation in and between high-rise 
apartment houses, the death of the street as a site of social interaction, 
and the practice of “zoning”, which establishes absolute lines of 
demarcation between work and residential areas, and between cultural 
and commercial activities. The transparent wall, used by such socialist 
modernists as Gropius to unite interior with exterior, was destined to 
become the very index of capitalist corporate exclusivity (37).
Thus arguments of the psychological disorders - considered as the 
“disease of the 1980s” - are relevant when we consider also the way 
individuals are deprived of verbal language to re-establish the necessary 
distinctions. As the verbal language is gradually replaced by the visual, the 
threat on identity formation expands.
The disorder that Olalquiaga finds appropriate in defining the current 
condition of the human subject is, as was mentioned before, psychasthenia. 
Psychasthenia helps describe contemporary experience and account for its 
uneasiness. Urban culture resembles this mimetic condition when it enables 
a ubiquitous feeling of being in all places while not really being anywhere. 
This feeling of ubiquitousness is at its extreme in the condition of cyberspace. 
This feeling is the triggering force that separates the body from the space.
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that blurs the boundaries of the body, defines the condition of uneasiness for 
identity, when it attacks the final bastion of the human identity -  the body.
Defined as a disturbance in the relation between self and surrounding 
territory, psychasthenia is a state in which the space defined by the 
coordinates of the organism’s body is confused with represented space. 
Incapable of demarcating the limits of its own body, lost in the immense area 
that circumscribes it, the psychasthenic organism proceeds to abandon its 
own identity to embrace the space beyond. It does so by camouflaging itself 
into the milieu. This simulation effects a double usurpation: while the 
organism successfully reproduces those elements it could not otherwise 
apprehend, in the process it is swallowed by them, vanishing as a 
differentiated entity (Olalquiaga 1-2).
Any sense of freedom gained by the absence of clearly marked boundaries, 
however, is soon lost to the reproduction ad infinitum of space -  a hall of 
mirrors in which passersby are dizzied into total oblivion. Instead of 
establishing coordinates from a fixed reference point, contemporary 
architecture fills the referential crash with repetition, substituting for location 
an obsessive duplication of the same scenario.
Lefebvre reminded us that even an apparently solid house is permeated 
from every direction”. Thus he writes: “...as exact a picture as possible of this 
space would differ considerably from the one embodied in the 
representational space which its habitants have in their minds, and which for 
all its inaccuracy plays an integral role in social practice.” If the built
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environment is conceived of in terms of the body, then a different body is at 
issue here (Bürgin 39).
In “Psycho-Analysis of Space”, Schilder writes: “There is at first an 
undifferentiated relation between an incompletely developed body-image and 
the outside space. Clearer differentiations take place around the openings of 
the body. There is a zone of indifference between body and outside world, 
which makes distortions of body-space, and outside-space by projection and 
appersonization possible” (295).
Appersonization is the process in which: “We may take parts of the bodies 
of others and incorporate them in our own body-image” (1950: 172). 
Concerning a pathological setting, such interchange of body parts is a 
symptom of “psychoses”. According to Freud, autism and schizophrenia, 
amongst what he calls the defense psychoses, are those which bear most 
directly on the corporeal relation to external reality. At one extreme of the 
continuum is autism, which represents a total closing down of that relation. 
At the other extreme is schizophrenia, which represents a total opening of the 
relation; to such an extent that the schizophrenic body is scattered in pieces 
throughout its world (Bürgin 41).
As Freud reminds us, “the frontier between the so-called normal states of 
mind and the pathological ones is to a great extent conventional, and ... is so 
fluid that each one of us probably crosses it many times in the course of a 
day.” Today, the autistic response of total withdrawal, and the schizophrenic
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anxiety of the body in pieces, belong to our psycho-corporeal forms of 
identification with the tele-topological puzzle of the city in pieces.
Today we can not disregard the actuality of the fact that a new way of 
perception is blurring and merging our distinctions of our identities, like 
Bladerunner coming true. In Bladerunner, based on Dick’s novel. Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, the way the space was evacuated, 
indicated another evacuation within the human subject, that deprived the 
human being of his reactions and feelings while the replicant, the artificial 
appeared with his wish to possess humanity as such. “I want more life, 
fucker...” cries Roy, the highly developed Nexus 6 replicant, to Rick Deckard, 
the protagonist, who has been ordered to hunt down and “retire” these 
rebellious replicants (Bukatman, 1997: 7). In this expression of machine 
versus human, important to argument of the city and the human being was 
the interrelatedness that triggered this evacuation, the way that the human 
body related to the urban space, the way that the urban space related to the 
human body, or to put it more bluntly, the way that the human body related 
to other bodies in the urban space.
Hence in this urban space, with the altering conceptions of space, and 
architecture, and enclosure, a certain subject is redeemed “a useless body”, 
the all-too-visibility is sweeping away the subject when and where the “truth 
is out there” (Baudrillard, 1983:129; Zizek 3-45).
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2.3 Public Space
Besides the aftermath of technology on the physicality of the city, another 
realm that is attributed to the urban geography, the public realm also had its 
share out of the subtle threat of cyberspace on human identity and space. 
Extensive historical work in cultural studies has stressed how apparently new 
forms of identity formation and content are often strongly dependent upon 
pre-existing social arrangements (Hall 6o). Therefore, to be able to 
comprehend what had altered in the social space of the city with the 
emergence of new technologies and new cyber-communities, one may have a 
clearer picture of what “public” came to mean in the eighteenth century city -  
the time the word “public” had taken on its modern meaning (Sennett, 1977:
17).
In the evolution of the concept of the “public”, there lay the struggle to 
define and delineate the border between the inside and the outside. 
Considering the identity of the individual, confusions in the social space arose 
later in the evolution of the public -  in the blurring of the border and the 
disappearing distinction between the inside and the outside. In the pre­
industrial urban setting, strangers talked openly to one another.
What public came to mean was a closure of individuality, when it first 
meant anything, it was that you could be in places where you are with people 
who are not your family or your friends, but yet with the industrial revolution 
there appeared the notion that you had no right to speak to those strangers.
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With the onset of the industrial revolution and its cold penetration into 
the public, nineteenth century city witnessed the withdrawal of the individual 
into the private realm; social interaction remained scarce while the persons 
outside the private realm remained strangers.
Each person withdrawn into himself, behaves as though he is a 
stranger to the destiny of all others. His children and his good friends 
constitute for him the whole of the human species. As for his 
transactions with his fellow citizens, he may mix among them, but he 
sees them not; he touches them, but does not feel them; he exists only 
in himself and for himself alone. And if on these terms there remains 
in his mind a sense of family, there no longer remains a sense of 
society (Tocqueville qtd. in Sennett, 1977:1).
What lied beneath this closure of the private was the emerging behavior, 
as the emerging belief, that the psyche had to be isolated from the external 
effects to fulfill its internal completion. Few people today would claim that 
psychic life arose from spontaneous generation, independent of social 
conditions and environmental influences. Nevertheless, the psyche was 
treated as though it had an inner life of its own. This psychic life was seen as 
so precious and so delicate that it would wither “if exposed to the harsh 
realities of the social world and “would flower only to the extent that “it is 
protected and isolated” (Sennett, 1977: 4). Thus in this primary definition of 
the private life and of the isolation of the psyche; each person’s self had 
become his principal burden; to know oneself had become an end, instead of 
a means through which one knows the world.
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This conflict of isolation versus interaction, in the sense of its contribution 
to the development of the self, was also identified by Goethe:
From early on I have suspected that the so important sounding task 
“know thyself’ is a ruse of a cabal of priests. They are trying to seduce 
man from activity in the outside world, to distract him with impossible 
demands; they seek to draw him into a false inner contemplation. Man 
only knows himself insofar as he knows the world -  the world which 
he only comes to know in himself and himself only in it (qtd. in 
Sennett, 1991:1).
Thus, before any definition of public was made, this self-absorption of the 
individual was the main reason of the difficulty of arriving at a principle, of 
giving any clear account to ourselves or to others of what our personalities 
were. This “claustrophobic” sense of identity indicated one of the extremes 
that the human identity had ever undergone in the history of civilization and 
the city in history, while today, the schizophrenic sense of identity defines yet 
the other extreme.
The sense of public, in its long evolution, had eradicated the walls that 
kept the self isolated, before even the distinction, the border between the 
private and the public was invented, while as it evolved further up to date, 
has eradicated itself with the meltdown of the boundaries once again to 
relieve what had kept these two realms apart. As in the sense of identity, so in 
the pillars of the city, was this evolution important for it underlined a raison 
d’etre of the city space as well as of identity.
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It was nevertheless in the city space, where the sense of who the public 
were was delineated and where one was when one was out “in public” was 
defined; the concept became enlarged in the early eighteenth century in both 
Paris and London.
Bourgeois people became less concerned to cover up their social origins; 
there were many more of them; the cities they inhabited were becoming a 
world in which widely diverse groups in society were coming into contact. By 
the time the word “public” had taken on its modern meaning, therefore, it 
meant, not only a region of social life located apart from the realm of family 
and close friends, but also that this public realm of acquaintances and 
strangers included a relatively wide diversity of people. “Public” thus came to 
mean a life passed outside the life of family and close friends; in the public 
region diverse, complex social groups were to be brought into ineluctable 
contact. The focus of this public life was the capital city (Sennett, 1977:17).
Behaving with strangers in an emotionally satisfying way and yet 
remaining aloof from them was seen by the mid-eighteenth century as the 
means by which the human animal was transformed into a social being. 
Together, public and private created what today would be called a “universe” 
of social relations.
The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth 
century was marked by the fundamental change in the ideas of public and 
private which followed upon the great revolutions at the end of the century 
and the rise of a national industrial capitalism in more modern times. What
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public came to mean, when it first meant anything, was that one could have a 
life outside the home, one could be in places with people who were not 
his/her family or friends, yet there remained a distance that defined the 
border between the public and the private, and that had kept them separate. 
This defining space in between grew even wider with the industrial revolution 
and a notion which was unknown until then had appeared: You had no right 
to speak to those who are strangers.
Industrial capitalism was equally and directly at work on the material life 
of the public realm itself. For instance, the mass production of clothes, and 
the use of mass production patterns by individual tailors or seamstresses, 
meant that many diverse segments of the cosmopolitan public began in gross 
to take on a similar appearance, that public markings were losing distinctive 
forms. Yet virtually, no one believed that society was becoming thereby 
homogenized; the machine meant that social differences -  important 
differences, necessary to know if one were to survive in a rapidly expanding 
milieu of strangers -  were becoming hidden, and the stranger more 
intractably a mystery. The machine production of a wide variety of goods, 
sold for the first time in a mass-merchandising setting, the department store, 
succeeded with the public not through appeals to utility or cheap price, but 
rather by capitalizing on this mystification. Even as they became more 
uniform, physical goods were endowed in advertising with human qualities, 
made to seem tantalizing mysteries which had to be possessed to be 
understood.
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Still in the alternating realm, the bourgeoisie continued to believe that 
“out in public” people experienced sensations and human relations which one 
could not experience any other social setting or context. Out in public was 
where moral violation occurred and was tolerated; in public one could break 
the laws of respectability. This sense of being “out in public” meant in fact, 
that one was in a growing milieu of strangers, who remained unknown and to 
whom one remained unknown. It might be claimed that this notion coincides 
with our sense of being “out in cyberspace”, where the identity is no longer 
intertwined with visibility, and that this invisibility allows for the moral 
violation to occur and to be tolerated -  at least to the extent that the newly 
developing ethics of cyberspace, “netiquette” allows -  in cyberspace one 
could break the laws of respectability. The advanced intrigue of cyberspace 
that expands the sense of freedom is that there is no geography, no limiting 
identity involved, since all the people involved are total strangers to one 
another. This phenomenon as observed by Mark Dery, editor of Flame Wars: 
The Discourse of Cvberculture. is explained as, “authors are sometimes 
anonymous, often pseudonymous, and almost always strangers.” This 
incorporeality and invisibility, that transcends the borders of the previous 
definitions of sociality heralds new possibilities on the cyberspace frontier:
[A] technologically enabled, postmulticultural vision of identity [is] 
disengaged from gender, ethnicity, and other problematic 
constructions. On-line, users can float free of biological and 
sociocultural determinants, at least to the degree that their 
idiosyncratic language usage does not mark them as white, black, 
college-educated, a high-school drop-out, and so on (560-1).
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Moreover, these new possibilities posed a challenge to the earlier idea of 
the public as an immoral domain, which meant rather different things to 
women and men. But once freed from the constraints of a gendered body in 
cyberspace, what was observed in the industrial capitalist city of early 
nineteenth century no longer applied. The public domain, for women was 
where one risked losing virtue, dirtying oneself, being swept into “a 
disorderly and heady swirl” (Thackeray qtd, in Sennett, 1977: 23), For 
women, the public and the idea of disgrace were closely allied. The public for 
a bourgeoisie man had a different moral tone. By going out in public, or 
“losing yourself in public”, as the phrase occurred in ordinary speech a 
century ago, a man was able to withdraw from those very repressive and 
authoritarian features of respectability which were supposed to be incarnate 
in his person, as father and husband, in the home. Therefore, for men, the 
immorality of public life was allied to an undercurrent of sensing immorality 
to be a region of freedom, rather than of simple disgrace, as it was for women 
(Sennett, 1977: 23),
By the middle of the last century, experience gained in company of 
strangers came to seem a matter of urgent necessity in the formation of one’s 
personality. One’s personal strengths might not develop if one did not expose 
oneself to strangers -  one might be too inexperienced, too naïve to survive. In 
the ancien regime, public experience was connected to the formation of 
personality. Worldly experience as an obligation for self-development 
appeared in the great monuments of the last century’s culture, as well as in its 
more everyday codes of belief; the theme speaks in Balzac’s Illusion Perdues. 
in Tocqueville’s Souvenirs, in the works of the social Darwinists, This
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pervasive, painful, unreasonable theme was the conjunction of a surviving 
belief in the value of public experience with the new secular creed that all 
experiences may have an equal value because all have an equal, potential 
importance in forming the self.
Consequently, as the boundary between public and private was no longer 
at work, and so was the line between private feeling and public display. What 
is today popularly misnamed “unconscious” behavior was foreshadowed by 
these ideas of involuntary disclosure of character in public. In a milieu where 
sensation and feeling, once aroused, are thought to be displayed beyond the 
power of the will to conceal them, withdrawal from feeling is the only means 
of keeping some measure of invulnerability. The only sure defense is try to 
keep oneself from feeling, to have no feelings to show.
In this society on its way to becoming intimate -  wherein character was 
expressed beyond the control of the will, the private was superimposed on the 
public, the defense against being read by others was to stop feeling -  one’s 
behavior in public was altered in its fundamental terms. Silence in public 
became the only way one could experience public life, especially street life, 
without feeling overwhelmed. In the mid-nineteenth century there grew up in 
Paris and Lx)ndon, and hence in other Western capitals, a pattern of behavior 
unlike what was known in London or Paris a century before, or is known in 
most of the non-Western world today: There grew up the notion that 
strangers had no right to speak to each other, that each man possessed as a 
public right an invisible shield, a right to be left alone.
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And gradually public behavior became a matter of consumption, of 
passive participation, of a certain kind of voyeurism. The “gastronomy of the 
eye”, Balzac called it; one is open to everything, one rejects nothing a priori 
from one’s purview, provided one needn’t become a participant, enmeshed in 
a scene. This invisible wall of silence as a right meant that knowledge in 
public was a matter of observation -  of scenes, of other men and women. 
Knowledge was no longer to be produced by social intercourse (Sennett, 1977: 
28).
The paradox of visibility and isolation which haunted so much of modern 
public life originated in the right to silence in public which took form in the 
last century. Isolation in the midst of visibility to others was a logical 
consequence of insisting on one’s right to be mute when one ventured into 
this chaotic yet still magnetic realm.
2.4 Muteness: The Mute Individual of the City
In the introversion of man and the closure that allowed the distinct 
separation from the other, from the stranger of the urban scene was the 
individual deprived of his main tool of communication -  disarmed ojf his 
speech. Lying at the heart of this notion was the fear of the other, not 
knowing the other, being in a homogeneous crowd of strangers. Forming the 
basis of urban paranoia, this sense was highly integrated with the modern 
ethos of “minding your own business”, and social interaction was less desired 
than ever (Knox 25). In this “landscape of human silences”, on the stage of
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visibility o f the other, and visibility to the other, the eye assumed a new role, 
that of doing a kind of sociological work which was previously done by the 
voice (Sennett, 1994: 62).
The modern environment was full of mechanical noise but it lacked the 
verbal language. This sense of deprivation was expanding the threat on 
identity, as the voice of disorder was heard louder and louder and meanwhile 
verbal language was gradually replaced by the visual and thereby blurring the 
distinctions between the self and the other even further.
It was not only by the public space but also by the changing physicality of 
the city; the geographic dispersion of the city, the driver’s detachment, and 
the rise of television that accomplished what the nineteenth century police 
was not able to do. The density of talking bodies has thinned out, and 
physical contact between them has weakened; watching television was a more 
passive experience than reading. Talk lacked the space in which it was 
collective action, despite people still talking to strangers in bars or on 
airplanes.
According to Sennett’s concern, the eye assumed a very harsh 
responsibility:
As the city has fallen silent, the eye has become the organ through 
which people now got their direct information about strangers. What 
social knowledge comes to the eye, looking around in silence? (1994:
63)
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The pre-industrial, dense urban center was a place in which strangers 
talked openly to one another, on the street as in coffee houses, cafés, shops, 
and government buildings. More than sociable impulses moved strangers to 
talk to one another; in an age without mass communication, talk was the 
most important means of gaining information, especially among the large 
mass of people who could not read. Some critics have argued that the growth 
of mass literacy commenced the process of eroding discussion among 
strangers, so that people increasingly read about others rather than talked to 
them, but this was not the case. The advent of the modern newspaper in the 
eighteenth century sharpened, if anything, the impulse to talk; displayed on 
racks in cafes and bars, the newspapers served as points of discussion for the 
people who read them in public. Throughout the nineteenth century, men felt 
free to speak to others on the street, intervening when something unruly 
occurred or striking up casual conversations. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, however, the authorities feared the political consequences of 
strangers gathering together to talk, knowing that social revolt could be 
ignited by the sparks of the discussion. In London, Paris and Berlin, a police 
system of spies and repressive laws operated throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, attempting to keep people from talking too much to each 
other in bars, pubs, and in public squares. Thus regulation proceeded into 
paranoia.
With the phenomenon of cyberspace, the individual has lost his ability to 
speak in the cyberspace. The flight from the body has disarmed the man of 
his speech again, reducing speech to chat on the Internet, while it reduced the 
space of interaction to the chatrooms. The speech, language, that was
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necessary to the man to justify his presence to himself has been evacuated, 
his representation to himself thus reduced. In Debordian terms, what was 
once directly lived has become pure representation.
But then, what if representation is separated from the body? What if 
representation is already separated from the body? Perhaps this is the 
perplexing point about the identity of the human being in the contemporary 
society. The image of man is deterritorialized. The lost connection between 
man and his image is the disease of the 1980s. According to Olalquiaga, this 
is the basis of disorder, disorder stems from the (dis)connection between the 
individual and the environment.
It was also in this context of muteness that the example of psychasthenia, 
developed with respect to the current architecture, helped define this 
contemporary experience; the psychasthenic organism begins to abandon its 
own identity to embrace the space beyond, losing its spatial boundaries, it 
camouflages itself into the space. From an urban sociological point of view, 
this may go hand-in-hand with the urban paranoia, in a constant sense of 
paranoia, the individual disappears into the crowd to be safe from all that 
causes the uneasiness, nevertheless, the individual does not appear as ‘one’ of 
the crowd, instead the crowd becomes all that causes the uneasiness.
The urban space then, was a landscape o f human silences, but not the 
space of social interaction anymore.
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2.5 From Paranoia to Schizophrenia
A 1903 essay by Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life” drew a 
complicated portrait of the city as a site of emphatic sensation and 
kaleidoscopic variety. The “swift and continuous shift of external and internal 
stimuli” provoked new mental attitudes in its inhabitants, and this 
“intensification of emotional life” was neither entirely positive nor 
unswervingly negative (325). A commitment to commerce reduced human 
beings to numbers or quantities, the crowd, but the city’s size also offered 
opportunities for exploration and growth, personal as well as economic. The 
economic imperatives of the city might “hollow out the core of things” and 
flatten distinctions between people and objects, but it was an expansive 
environment: in the city, “the individual’s horizon [was] enlarged” (330; 
324). It was easy to get lost in the metropolis; it was also possible to define 
oneself anew.
The journey of disorders, suggested by the title is one that defines the 
path through which “the individual” was transformed to “a man of the 
crowd”, and then into a “terminal of multiple networks” scattered and 
dispersed through the capillaries of the communication network. 
Oversimplifying the notion of “disorder”, this analysis of the process is 
predicated on the way human subject was identified and named, every now 
and then, by the subsequent effects of eras that brought about substantial 
change, be that the pre-capitalist, modern or the postmodern. Postmodern, 
although it does not signify an era, in the same manner that the others do, 
although it is still a stage in the course of modernity as in Habermas’s
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definition of modernity as “an incomplete project”; for the sake of the 
argument, postmodernism is used, from time to time, for purposes of 
indicating to today’s world, which is thickly inhabited and influenced by the 
computer and the communication technologies.
The city, after its invasion by technological developments, became the 
proud screen for displaying the power of technology, first by the machine, 
and later even so by the computer. The noise of technology was so loud that 
the muteness of the human subject was barely heard. First, as the machine 
entered the urban land, technology drew many people to cities, reducing the 
human subject to exist under the tag of labour. So there was the crowd that 
veiled the silent scream of the human subject, as it disappeared into the void. 
As if the turbulence that the sudden apparentness of the machine, as a means 
of production, was not sufficient; out came the machine, crawling out of the 
production place, invading the streets, the buildings, and even the open 
spaces. It walked firmly still, into our private spaces and lives. In our living 
room was the TV that stared blankly and indifferently at us. We moved 
swiftly on the streets crowded with cars and more cars, we were strong and 
rigid in our automobile armors, but weak and fragile, if we ever tried to 
resurrect the flâneur of good old modern Paris.
All the same, these storms of change, allowed a cavity for a metaphorical 
“space of literature”, where the impact of these changes on the identity could 
be traced, ranging from the early literal definitions of daily life by the 
physiologies of IQ**' Century Paris, to the later originated idea of the detective 
stories and then on the extension of the journey beyond the modern, the
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science fiction literature, that narrated “the dissolution of the most 
fundamental structures of human existence” (Bukatman, 1997: 8). These new 
genres that evolved in the course 'of the time with the substantial changes 
were not only witnesses to the change that took place, but also evidences by 
themselves if we concern the way that they were generated. Following the 
traces of the idea of disorder, by the way it was represented on the surface of 
literature, proved just as good an experience as the review of the public 
surface, or the built environment.
Concerning the built environment again, if Paris was “the capital of the 
19‘‘> Century”, capital of the transition to modem, then it must be New York 
that portrays postmodern all too apparent today (Benjamin qtd. in Sennett, 
1977: 129). In focusing the tensions at that time sweeping through all of 
western Europe, Paris made their structure and consequences manifest, and 
thus the city was, like New York of today, a place of both fascination and 
horror to others. It was as if in Paris Europeans saw a disease creeping into 
all their lives, and yet could not avert their gaze from the sick patient 
(Sennett, 1977:129). The delirium of space is all too evident in New York, the 
way Olalquiaga portrays it; New York is the continuum in which all 
boundaries and borders disappeared into one, is the last bastion of human 
uneasiness in the city.
Exploring the primary departure for the journey of the human body in the 
changing space, we may go back to the beginning of the 19*^  century in Paris. 
In parallel with the significant alteration of the economical life and the public 
space, the urban social geography was also changing, through the swift
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passages in between these phases. The transition to modernity was captured 
as Baudelaire moved fearfully into the traffic-laden boulevards of 
Haussman’s Paris:
I was crossing the boulevard, in a great hurry, in the midst of a moving 
chaos, with death galloping me from every side (qtd. in Berman 159).
Baudelaire’s words drew attention to a chaotic and anxious perception of 
the modern city as well as to a crowded space which manifestly displayed an 
overflow of activity on the outside, nevertheless the evacuation of the sense of 
public from within. As Sennett witnesses the transition; to an old women of 
Paris, surviving into the 1880s, the contrasts between the city of her youth 
and the city of her old age might have appeared to her as the feverish growth 
of public life in the 19^ *^  century, and to tell her that the city was ceasing to be 
a public culture would have drawn a snort of derision (Sennett, 1977:125).
In the modern, the impact of the space, as well as that of the mass of 
strangers on the human subject, was deep but clear. The convergence of the 
inside and the outside occurred, slowly but surely, blurring the border that 
kept them distinct, replacing the inside with the outside every now and then. 
This convergence was also removing gradually the border that kept the public 
distinct from private, the one that kept the human subject as an “individual” 
out of the crowd. But the convergence and the replacement was such that in 
every act of losing the border, it appeared anew, in every step of substitution 
the distinction was underlined and more apparent than it was before. To 
trace the steps of this process, one could follow those of the flâneur, who
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strolled on the wide boulevards and arcades of Paris in the 19th century; 
“who turn[ed] the boulevard into an intérieur”, “who [went] botanizing on 
the asphalt”:
The street becomes a dwelling for the flâneur, he is as much at home 
among the façades of houses as a citizen is in his four walls. To him the 
shiny, enameled signs of businesses are at least as good a wall 
ornament as an oil painting is to a bourgeois in his salon. The walls are 
the desk against which he presses his notebooks; news-stands are his 
libraries and the terraces of cafés are the balconies from which he 
looks down on his household after his work is done (Benjamin 37).
Nevertheless, his convergence of the inside and the outside as such was 
still an innocent one, and one where the two realms had approached one 
another, but yet had not merged into one. One could see in the reversal of the 
inside and the outside, still the opposite duality of the two, perhaps even 
highlighted. One could see the “porosity” of the membrane that kept them 
from merging (Lacis qtd. in Buck-Morss 26).
The flâneur who turned the street into a living room committed an act of 
transgression, which reversed an established distinction between public and 
private spaces. In this act of reversal, in the possibility of the penetration 
through the now porous membrane that allowed the space for one to be the 
other, Benjamin and Lacis saw the survival of the pre-capitalist social forms 
which had not yet succumbed to the modern (Bürgin 36).
Lefebvre finds both that, around 1910, “a certain space was shattered” and 
that “it did not disappear”. The phallocentric abstract space of capitalist
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modernity survived to inhabit the representational space of aesthetic 
modernism (Bürgin 38). Indeed, it survives into the present day. It is not that 
one spatial formation was replaced by another. It is rather as if a superior 
‘layer’ of spatial representations itself became permeable, ‘porous’, and 
allowed an inferior layer to show through. Lefebvre himself supplies the 
appropriate analogy. He notes that early in the genesis of a biological 
organism, “an indentation forms in the cellular mass. A cavity gradually takes 
place. [...] The cells adjacent to the cavity form a screen or membrane which 
serves as a boundary [...] A closure thus comes to separate within from 
without, so establishing the living being as a “distinct body”. This ‘closure’, 
however, is only ever relative: “The membranes in question remain 
permeable, punctured by pores and orifices. Traffic back and forth, so far 
from stopping, tends to increase and become more differentiated, embracing 
both energy exchange (alimentation, respiration, excretion) and information 
exchange (the sensory apparatus)”. Bürgin translates this point that Lefebvre 
had made as “Closure, then, rather than belonging to the natural order, is a 
creation of the social order” (38). This was easily observed in the 
development of the public, as the “individual” of the pre-capitalist era opened 
up the borders that kept the self apart from the public, and then at the same 
time closed dovm the border to keep the public as the other, as the stranger. 
Thus, Lefebvre writes: “A defining characteristic of (private) property, as of 
the position in space of a town, nation or nation state, is a closed frontier. 
This limiting case aside, however, we may say that every spatial envelope 
implies a barrier between inside and out, but that this barrier is always 
relative and, in the case of membranes, always permeable” (175-6). Then it 
was the same case with the individual, who sought to achieve a closure of the
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self with advent of the modern, detaching further from his nature, 
nevertheless remaining fragile with his porous membrane.
Vitalizing this porous membrane and being vitalized through it, the 
flâneur exists, trying to make sense of the new. The flâneur, was one of the 
leading characters of the so-caWed physiologies, which began to appear late in 
the first half of the 19*^  century. These were short articles published in the 
newspapers and journals of the time which sought to describe the various 
characters found in the crowd. For Benjamin, the emergence of physiologies 
was the solidification of the response to the “quantitative change in human 
numbers and its qualitative impact on human experience” (Gilloch 140). As 
Benjamin notes, the first reaction of one who observed the crowd was that of 
“fear, revoltion and horror” and thus the urban physiologies that had 
appeared were the literary expression of the desire to allay the paranoia 
engendered by a life among strangers (Benjamin 131). Supposedly humorous 
skecthes of the crowd, these texts presented rather crude and facile 
stereotypes for the reassurance of the readers. A physiognomist, was defined 
in Benjamin’s description of the writer Heinrich Heine von Hoffman, was, 
one who perceived the extraordinaiy, in specific people, things, houses, 
objects, streets: “As you have perhaps heard, one calls people who are able to 
discern people from people’s faces, from their gait, from their hands or from 
their head-shape, their character, occupation, or even their fate, 
‘physiognomist’.” This definition predicated upon Benjamin’s notion of 
monadological approach, in his concern of the city as a monad, an entity that 
encapsulates the characteristic features of modern social and economic
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structures, and thereby as the site for their most precise and unambigious 
interpretation (Gilloch 5-6).
The conceit of physiognomy was very much different than that of the 
detective story, that evolved in turn; particularly on the point that the 
physiognomy implied the observation of the normal daily life in the 
metropolis, and hoped to seek a way to cope with the paranoia that was 
bound to arise with the crowd; while the alleviation of panic was not the goal 
of the second genre. Detective stories were the products of a dubious eye, 
wandering over the crowd, seeking to play upon with and exacerbate the fear. 
Unlike the “dull” physiologies, the detective story “was to have a great future” 
as “the literature which concerned itself with the disquieting and threatening 
aspects of urban life” (Benjamin 40). The rise of the detective story was the 
fall of a common point made by the physiologies; the way that they had 
pictured the stranger as eccentric and simple, attractive or severe was a 
description with an undercurrent that implied the stranger to be “harmless” 
and “of perfect bonhomie” had to decline (Benjamin 37). With the detective 
story, the uneasiness of a special sort peculiar to the crowd, was finally voiced 
and pronounced. This was also the end of a particular bourgeois fantasy of 
the crowd as safe haven, the comfortable and comforting assumption not that 
you were just like everyone else, but that everyone else was really just like you 
(Gilloch 140).
This apparent outcome highligted the distinction between the self and the 
other, and yet the self as a closed entity, enclosed in a vulnerable and fragile, 
bordered yet porous body. The visibility of the body and yet the isolation of
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the self was a lucid contradiction that challenged the individual in 
maintaining individuality, yet defining the self a separate identity. The daily 
life, previously thought to be indispensable to forming the identity, ended up 
in the blossom of a “flower of evil”, that never died out until then, that never 
vanished from the face of the earth of the self. The body, and all the same the 
identity, was now threatened by its visibility, by the realization of the porous 
membrane that it was contained in. In the terror of the vulnerable, when 
everyone was somewhat a conspirator, everybody would be in a situation 
where they have to play detective. This involved yet another emphasis on the 
visible.
Once again an analogy drawn from the city is appropriate in portraying 
the condition of the identity; extending the analogy of the biological organism 
to the social space of the built environment, Lefebvre reminds us that even an 
apparently solid house is “permeated from every direction by streams of 
energy which run in and out of it by every imaginable route: water, gas, 
electricity, telephone lines, radio and television signals, and so on”. Thus the 
identity in the social space and in the closure of its represented space was 
open, through the porosity of its membrane, to any threat that existed on the 
outside. Lefebvre continues “as exact a picture as possible of this space would 
differ considerably from the one embodied in the representational space 
which its inhabitants have in their minds, and which for all its inaccuracy 
plays an integral role in social practice” (qtd. in Burgin 39).
As Baudrillard beautifully describes; this was “the era of the discovery and 
exploration of daily life” (Baudrillard, 1983:126). Indeed it was exploration of
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the limit, which was not transcended yet. In other words, it was for most part, 
the days of a promenade, that wandered along the streets and boulevards -  
not an automobile ride that erased the distinctions of the space into a 
continuum; the days of the urban “scene” -  not the television image that 
reduced the “surrounding universe to a control screen” (Baudrillard 127). By 
the same token, the individual maintained existence, though slipping slightly 
into the realm of immanence.
What was significantly at stake was also the issue of visibility, which 
brought about the withdrawal of the self into the depth of the inside, into the 
isolation of its enclosed space, where could never be left alone. This 
engendered a new sense of vision on the outside, a safe and pleasurable one, 
as long as it remained on the outside.
The flâneur enjoyed a kind of voyeurism, “deriving pleasure from his 
location within the crowd”, of his passive participation. The “gastronomy of 
the eye,” Balzac called it; provided one needn’t become a participant, 
enmeshed in a scene (Sennett, 1977: 27). As was also apparent, this motive of 
the crowd, in the narrator of Poe’s story “The Man of the Crowd”, who found 
enormous joy in examining the crowd, watching the crowd go by. Here, in 
this story it was not the “man of the crowd”, but the narrator was worth 
noting, who was fascinated by the crowd. Set in London, its narrator is a man 
who, after a long illness, ventures out again for the first time into the hustle 
and bustle of the city. In the late afternoon hours of an autumn day he installs 
himself behind a window in a big London coffee-house. He looks over the
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other guests, pores over advertisements in the paper, but his main focus of 
interest is the throng of people surging past his window in the street:
[The] latter is one of the principal thoroughfares of the city, and had 
been very much crowded during the whole day. But, as the darkness 
came on, the throng momently increased; and by the time the lamps 
were well lighted, two dense and continuous tides of population were 
rushing past the door. At this particular period of the evening I had 
never before been in a similar situation, and the tumultuous sea of 
human heads filled me, therefore, with a delicious novelty of emotion. 
I gave up, at length, all care of things within the hotel, and became 
absorbed in contemplation of the scene without (475).
Nevertheless as Benjamin notes, Poe’s observer succumbs to the 
fascination of the scene, which finally lures him outside into the whirl of the 
crowd (129). His intensions and his drive in merging into the crowd is still 
one of vision, one of voyeurism.
The passivity, the withdrawal rendered on the substitution of the 
operations of the ear by those of the eye, or to put it more bluntly, by the 
eradication of language. “As the flâneur parades down the street, people 
watch him; they do not feel free any longer to go up and speak to him. The 
passive spectator, the onlooker silent and amazed...” sums up the condition of 
the spectator, Sennett in The Fall of the Public Man. People had to adapt 
themselves to this new and rather strange situation, one that is peculiar to 
big cities. Simmel has felicitously formulated what was involved here 
(Benjamin 37).
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Someone who sees without hearing is much more uneasy than 
someone who hears without seeing. In this there is something 
characteristic of the sociology of the big city. Interpersonal 
relationships in big cities are distinguished by a marked 
preponderance of the activity of the eye over the activity of the ear. The 
main reason for this is the public means of transportation. Before the 
development of buses, railroads and trams in the nineteenth century, 
people had never been in a position of having to look at one another 
for long minutes or even hours without speaking to one another (486).
This new situation was, as Simmel recognized, not a pleasant one. The 
uneasiness was not only one of being seen by others, but also the obligation 
of having to see the others, while it was no longer possible to be relieved by 
depicting them as harmless, benign figures. What led to the emergence of the 
detective story was yet this unceasable “horror” involved in the crowd. As 
Benjamin indicates, there would have been no tendency to examine such 
“motifs” of the crowd, if it was not for the uneasiness. Benjamin’s notes the 
relevancy of a thoughtful observation by Heine:
“Heine’s eyesight,” wrote a correspondent in a letter to Varnhagen in 
1838, “caused him acute trouble in the spring. On the last such 
occasion I was walking down one of the boulevards with him. The 
magnificence, the life, of this in its way unique thoroughfare roused 
me to boundless admiration, something that prompted Heine this time 
to make a significant point in stressing the horror with which this 
center of the world was tinged (131).
Benjamin’s interpretation of this uneasiness as fear, revulsion, and 
horror; were the very emotions that the big-city crowd aroused in those who 
observed it, defined a moment of “shock” -  of vision (132), Baudelaire speaks
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of a man who plunges into the crowd as if into a “reservoir of electric energy”. 
He calls this man “a kaleidoscope equipped with consciousness”. Perhaps this 
sense of “shock” aroused by the crowd is the most obvious in the case of the 
“immigrant” who has just set foot in the metropolis. Sennett summarized the 
condition of the immigrant:
An urban situation has been taken as one in which strangers are likely 
to meet routinely. We have been concerned with the social psychology 
of encounters between strangers; in the 19th Century in western 
Europe as well as southern and southeastern Europe, a sharp mral 
dislocation occurred. Partially a matter of famine, partially one of new 
forms of rural property ownership and the capitalization of farming, 
this upheavel sent masses of peasants and villagers out of their 
traditional homes, displacing them either to cities in Europe, to 
unknown provincial localities, or to the United States, Argentina, and 
Brazil. These displaced persons were thus also coming to experience 
encounters with strangers -  routinely, as part of the more general 
trauma of their uprooting (1977:128-129).
Not only is he alien to the crowd, all the activity going on around the city, 
but also to the scene, to the urban scene amidst which he stands. His horror 
is one lived at the climax, it overwhelms him, and he is a fountain that spurts 
out this horror, out on to the crowd. He is a reflecting mirror of the horror 
scene, in the days of the modern, nevertheless he becomes much more uneasy 
in today’s world, where his horror is the only means to his survival in the 
urban space. His adjustment phase can only follow this first shock. 
Nonetheless, it is not that it is his only shock, for the “shock” is the 
quintessential experience of the crowd and the definitive signature of
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modernity. And the city is the site of inundation and overwhelming of the 
individual by sudden, unexpected, diverse sense-impressions (Gilloch 143).
In this sense, the detective story was in some ways a tool, invented to cope 
with the uneasiness of visible, in line with its emphasis on observation of the 
visible. In its origin, lied the notion that it be investigating the functions that 
are peculiar to the masses in a big city, where “the masses appear as the 
asylum that shields an asocial person from his persecutors” as Benjamin 
derives from the emphasis of a police report as early as the turn of the 19'  ^
century. “It is almost impossible,” wrote a Parisian secret agent in 1798, “to 
maintain good behaviour in a thickly populated area where an individual is, 
so to speak, unknown to all others and thus does not have to blush in front of 
anyone” (40). Thereby the origins of the detective story were rooted in the 
issue of visibility, which became apparent first, of all the menacing aspects of 
the masses.
Detectives were, what every man and woman had to be when they wanted 
to make sense of the street. Baudelaire wrote: “An observer is a prince who is 
everywhere in possession of his incognito” (qtd. in Benjamin 40). 
Humorously reflecting the case is a piece from one of Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
Sherlock Holmes stories, “A Case of Identity”. A young woman walks into 
Holmes’s Baker Street flat; he takes one glance at her.
“Do you not find,” he said, “that with your short sight it is a little tyring 
to do so much typewriting?”
80
The girl and, as always, Watson are amazed that Holmes could deduce 
this. After she has left, Watson remarks:
“You appeared to have read a good deal upon her which was quite 
invisible to me.”
To which Holmes makes the famous reply:
“Not invisible but unnoticed, Watson. You did not know where to look, 
and so you missed all that was important. I can never bring you to 
realize the importance of sleeves, the suggestiveness of thumbnails, or 
the great issues that may hang from a boot-lace” (96).
The science of reading character from appearances was everwhere tinged 
with the portrayal of anxiety in the acts of reading, it was made to seem a 
dangerous necessity. The inhabitant of the modern city, was not only seeking 
to read a great deal from the appearances, but also inducing himself into his 
own closure to avoid detection in the street, “to deny to probing eyes a 
knowledge that should come to none indiscriminately in the city” (Thackeray 
qtd. in Sennett, 1977: 169). Theirs was a world of shaded lamps, hooded 
bonnets, rides in closed carriages. Indeed, beyond all the mystification 
produced by the machine, the very belief that appearance is an index of 
character would prompt people to make themselves nondescript in order to 
be as mysterious, as little vulnerable, as possible.
Nevertheless this undercurrent for paranoia was an ebb-and-flow, 
predicating on the ambiguity of the experience of the crowd. And even in this 
era where the minimal separation of the inside and the outside was
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preserved, identity was still kept distinct, there were marks of the 
schizophrenic subject everywhere. Headed by the terror of paranoia from 
within, the subject tended to merge with the crowd, in order to be 
nondescript, removing the borders of the self though only on the outside. 
Perhaps it was the limitedness of the space as yet, that kept schizophrenia 
from taking the lead. Engels describes the scene of London, in order to define 
the locked-up crowd and the identity:
... But the sacrifice which all this has cost became apparent later. 
After roaming the streets of the capital a day or two, making 
headway with difficulty through the human turmoil and the endless 
lines of vehicles, after visiting the slums of the metropolis, one 
realizes for the first time that these Londoners have been forced to 
sacrifice the best qualities of their human nature, to bring to pass all 
the marvels of civilization which crowd their city... The very turmoil 
of the streets has something repulsive, something against which 
human nature rebels. The hundreds of thousands of all classes and 
ranks crowding past each other, are they not all human beings with 
the same qualities and powers, and with the same interest in being 
happy? ... And still they crowd by one another as though they had 
nothing in common, nothing to do with one another, and their only 
agreement is the tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the 
pavement, so as not to delay the opposing stream of the crowd, while 
it occurs to no man to honour another with so much a glance. The 
brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private 
interest, becomes the repellent and offensive, the more these 
individuals are crowded together, within a limited space (qtd. in 
Benjamin 57-8).
The yZdneur only seems to break through this “unfeeling isolation of each 
in his private interest” by filling the hollow space created in him by such
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isolation, with the borrowed -  and fictitious -  isolations of strangers. Next to 
Engels’s clear description, it sounds obscure when Baudelaire writes: “The 
pleasure of being in a crowd is a mysterious expression of the enjoyment of 
the multiplication of numbers” (Benjamin 59). The flâneur was neither 
paranoiac nor schizophrenic.
For Baudelaire, and for Benjamin, the crowd is both generative of 
experience, producing intoxication, yet simultaneously destructive of it, 
leading to boredom. A shifting, fragile balance. On the one hand, destructive 
of genuine experience and diversity, the crowd rigorously regiments the 
individual and denies his or her autonomy. The crowd is the negation of 
individuality and the self. On the other hand, despite its brutalizing 
tendencies, the crowd retains a certain allure for the outcast who wishes to 
remain undetected. In the crowd one is able to lose oneself. The crowd is the 
finest setting in which to be alone, to find precisely that solitude which 
Benjamin found most desirable, to experience the “loneliness peculiar to the 
city” (Buck-Morss 128).
While Saisselin states that “the city expanded the range of the seeable” 
(21), for Benjamin it is the home of the unseeing stare, for the metropolis that 
one appear to look without seeing. In the crowded buses and trains of the city 
the passanger must still find empty spaces into which he or she may safely 
stare. In the metropolis the avoidance of the gaze and the refusal to return it 
are paramount (Gilloch 145). In the crowd, one may see many people, but 
one notices no one, one looks at no one, one recognizes no one. No 
distinctions are made. For Simmel, this leads to neurasthenia as the
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individual cultivates the “strangest eccentricities” in appearance and manner 
in order to be different, in the hope of attracting attention (336). For 
Benjamin, the crowd, like fashion, becomes the ceaseless parade of the 
always-the-same. The crowd is the dullness of the nothing-new, the ultimate 
locus of boredom. Nonetheless at the same time, the experience of the 
metropolis is based upon the avoidance of negative encounters as life 
becomes a purely defensive strategy (Gilloch 144). The urbanite has to 
manage “the rapid telescoping of changing images, pronounced differences 
within what is grasped at a single glance and, the unexpectedness of violent 
stimuli” (Simmel 325). He or she can only react mechanically, automatically. 
Interaction becomes instant reflex.
In this sense, the flâneur can be regarded very symbolic, in displaying the 
exact ambiguity that awaited the individual, for the flâneur enjoys being part 
of the crowd, nevertheless rejects disappering into the crowd. “The flâneur is 
that character who retains his individuality while all around are losing theirs” 
(Gilloch 153). The flâneur derives pleasure from his location within the 
crowd, but simultaneously regards the crowd with contempt, as nothing 
other than a brutal, ignoble mass. The flâneur “becomes their accomplice 
even as he dissociates himself from them. He is precisely the one who 
heroically resists incorporation into the milieu in which he moves. Indeed, 
the disappearance of the flâneur into the crowd, the instant in which they 
become “one flesh”, is the moment of extinction of the flâneur.
The era of the flâneur, at once so prim and in its habits and so unbuttoned 
in its momentary enthusiasms and dreams, is difficult today to imagine in all
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its complexity and all its grandeur. We see the primness as a slavery from 
which we have barely recovered a century later, the fantasy as false and 
perverse, a world of imagined passions and inflated perceptions which were 
only “compensation” for the rigors of propriety. It is difficult to perceive 
Balzac’s entrepreneurs, the flâneurs who walk the streets of Paris in 
Baudelaire’s poems, as both great and fatally diseased. It is difficult to 
understand how, despite our rebellion against them, their struggle with the 
eroding line between privacy and publicness was the seed of the present-day 
struggle with intimacy (Sennett, 1977:125-6).
Consequently, the identity of the individual was a pendulum that went 
from paranoia to schizophrenia and back to paranoia again and again. But in 
today’s world, where the identity has shifted from the securely closed, but 
porous self of the modern, to the dispersed identity of the postmodern, the 
journey was indeed one from paranoia to schizophrenia. Whether it is a 
pathology or a defense remains debateable for the conditions to come with 
the information technology triggered a need, a yearning to be schizophrenic.
With the “ecstasy of communication”, the body, landscape and time all 
disappear as scenes. The public space, “the theater of the social” is reduced 
more and more to a large soft body with many heads, where one could no 
longer detect the borders of the self, even if s/he intended to do so. Loss of 
the public space indicated simultaneously the loss of the private. “The one is 
no longer a spectacle, the other no longer a secret,” says Baudrillard(i3o). 
And the instant that the other is visible all too apparently before our eyes, is 
the moment that the pendulum would not swing back to paranoia. That’s the
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ecstasy of communication. The one and the other both are effaced in an 
obscenity, where the most intimate processes of our life becomes the virtual 
feeding ground of the media. All secrets, spaces and scenes are abolished in a 
single flow of information. That’s obscenity, that abolishes even paranoia, to 
define a new schizophrenic.
There also, one can perhaps make use of the old metaphors of 
pathology. If hysteria was the pathology of the exacerbated staging of 
the subject, a pathology of expression, of the body’s theatrical and 
operatic conversion; and if paranoia was the pathology of 
organization, of the structuration of a rigid and jealous world; then 
with communication and information, with the immanent 
promiscuityof all these networks, with their continual connections, we 
are now in a new form of schizophrenia. No more hysteria, no more 
projective paranoia, properly speaking, but this state of terror proper 
to the schizophrenic: too great a proximity of everything, the unclean 
promiscuity of everything which touches, invests and penetrates 
without resistance, with no halo of private protection, not even his 
own body, to protect him anymore (132).
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3 THERE IS A THERE  THERE
Identity is not in the past to be found, but in the future to be 
constructed. (Hall 62).
3.1 Cyberspace Coming Up
Cyberspace is a new electronic, invisible space that allows the computer or 
television screen to substitute for urban space and urban experience (Stone, 
1991: 105), ox for the body and the bodily experience. Though the term was 
overused and maybe from time to time misused; still, the phenomenon of 
cyberspace creates an aggressive redefinition of the human condition, in that 
the human subject is digitized and decentered and made invisible through the 
global stretch of cyberspace capillaries (Boyer 14). The invisibility achieved by 
the newly proliferating electronic technologies of the Information Age forms 
a threat to the destruction of the concepts of space and time; as these new 
technologies are circulating outside of the human experiences of space and 
time, the notions of space and time are apt to change. There is something 
almost uncanny in any description of “the virtual,” or in any other
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enthusiastic testimony that alludes to what the new worlds of virtual reality 
will one day provide. As mentioned in the previous chapter, although it is still 
in its infancy, this postmodern technology already offers new modes of 
perception and opens new spaces for the imaginary.
The inability to define and stabilize the notion of cyberspace and the 
future that the phenomenon indicates, leads, on one hand, to the common 
debate of order/disorder, or to the discourse of virtual reality or cyberspace, 
being a simulation of the already existing real world that we live in -  except 
for the confusing point that this simulation need not be one where physical 
rules of the real apply. In any case, what is new about cyberspace is not the 
idea of disorder with the virtual -  since it is already a debate of the actual -  
but the space that it opens for the imaginary, for the fantasy. Accordingly, 
this new sense of space, whose boundaries -  and limits - remain unexplored 
at the moment, creates a sense of escape, an escape from the world as we had 
known it, from our physicality, and visibility, and corporeality that bounded, 
and from our physical bodies that have been the only limit to our “earthly 
presences” so far.
This notion of abandoning the physicality is on the other hand, an 
expansion of our everlasting challenge of nature, similarly the sense of escape 
that cyberspace brings about connotes once again an escape from nature, 
from natural -  that is if nature still is the nature that we know and not the 
“technology as our nature” (Stone, 1991).
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This irredeemable sense that we desperately seek an escape has long been 
the issue of science fiction literature; nevertheless, as Mark Dery points out, 
cyberculture “seems as if it is on the verge of attaining escape velocity”, as he 
defines “escape velocity” to be “the speed at which a body -  a spacecraft, for 
instance -  overcomes the gravitational pull of another body, such as the 
Earth” (3). Even so, this escape, though it appears as a reminiscent of the 
extreme escape from the earth, the migration to the off-world colonies that 
Bladerunner assumes -  but all the same leaves open to question -  is an 
abandoning of the body limit, is “getting rid of the flesh”, or all the more 
implicit the disembodiment of the human and the visible of the human 
instead (Sobchack qtd. in Dery 310),
Cyberspace, as defined by William Gibson, is a “hallucinatory” space, an 
electronically generated alternate reality, and a physically inhabitable place 
whose reality is only attained by a “consensus” about “hallucination”. It is 
entered by means of direct links to the brain; that is, it is inhabited by 
refigured human “persons” separated from their physical bodies which 
remain in real space. However strange it may sound, this idea of a nonplace 
beyond the computer screen is significant in our contemporaneity; this 
nonplace had always been there, apparent with the telephone, with the 
telepresence that voice alludes in communicating via the telephone with 
another not physically present. In Slouka’s account, in today’s world, we are 
as comfortable with the superhuman speed -  and the level of abstraction it 
brings with it -  as we are with the telephone, which had, in a single stroke, 
distanced us from a habit as old as our species: talking to one another face-to- 
face. It was almost impossible, for the initial users of the telephone, our
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grandmothers and grandfathers, who found it striking to conceptualize 
another human being beyond the inanimate receiver; in order to 
communicate, they had to personify the receiver and speak to it, as to some 
mechanical pet, rather than through it to someone else (Slouka 3-4). It is 
similarly uneasy for us, to imagine a new space that is invisible to us but yet 
still inhabitable by our bodies.
What is new about cyberspace is that it involves this sense of space; it 
connotes a space where bodies appear. In Paul Virilio’s words, it is a 
completely new perspective, which does not coincide with the audio-visual 
perspective, which we already know:
It is a tactile perspective. To see at a distance, to hear at a distance: 
that was the essence of the audio-visual perspective of old. But to 
reach at a distance, to feel at a distance, that amounts to shifting the 
perspective towards a domain it did not yet encompass: that of 
contact, of contact-at-a-distance: tele-contact (par. 4).
This spatial gist has evolved within the progress of the notion of 
virtuality in the older audio-visual perspective, beginning with the 
telephone and the radio -  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” -  and 
gradually penetrating our conscious with the electronic bulletin board 
systems, and gaining new dimensions with the Habitat developed by Chip 
Morningstar and Randall Farmer, a project that brought a 2-D visibility to 
the virtual space of communication (Stone, 1991: 87). Habitat was a large- 
scale social experiment that was accessible through common telephone-line 
computer networks. Designed for Lucas Films, Habitat first existed as a 35-
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foot mural located in California, but on-line, each area of the mural 
represented an expandable area in cyberspace. It was inhabitable in that, 
once on-line, the user had a window into the ongoing social life of 
cyberspace -  the social life, the community inside the computer. The 
virtual person, who is the user’s representative, was visualized on the 
screen as a cartoon figure, which may be customized from a menu of body 
parts (Stone, 1991: 93-4). This project alluded a new dimension in 
virtuality, in that it demonstrated the possibility that we might have a 
visuality even to our virtual selves.
As the body you were in was by no means your own body in the Habitat. 
in the further elaborated cyberspace, the physical rules of normal did not 
need to apply and thus it did not need to encompass any real physicality of 
the body. Cyberspace in the vivid imagination of Gibson, was entered by 
means of direct links to the brain -  because by then the Chinese had invented 
nerve-splicing (4) -  that is, it was inhabited by refigured human “persons” 
separated from their physical 
bodies, which were parked in real 
space. Thus, in cyberspace, no 
measures to remind our body of 
its limits was necessary, the 
physical laws of real space did not 
need to apply; nevertheless some 
experiential rules carried over 
from normal space; for example.
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the geometry of cyberspace as Gibson defined it was Cartesian, thus a virtual 
grid was behind the order of the virtual. In Neuromancer. the “original” body 
was the authenticating source for the refigured person in cyberspace; no 
“persons” existed whose presence was not warranted by the concomitant 
existence of a physical body back in “normal” space. But death was all the 
same real, in cyberspace, in the sense that if the “person” in cyberspace died, 
the body in normal space died also, and vice versa (Stone, 1995: 34).
Although it has still not occurred to be our everyday reality in the way 
Gibson had described, we are moving towards this virtuality at an increasing 
speed. More and more we are convinced, like the sagely cyborg in Bruce 
Sterling’s science fiction novel Schismatrix. that “there is a whole world 
behind this screen” (179), as we are spending ever greater amounts of our 
lives in cyberspace, while the notion of community evolves into 
cybercommunities and being is reduced to the disembodiment of the human. 
More and more people are communicating with each other behind the screen, 
even in the case of physical proximity. But in the case of the physically 
separated, the new space creates the opportunity to be liberated from place as 
well as from space:
Yet, at the same time, liberated from local ties by the ability to 
communicate at global distances, the religious, political and economic 
refugees of the 19**^  century attained a certain freedom from parental 
cultures that allowed them to leave, and at the same time, except 
under conditions of slavery, encouraged a less claustrophobic sense of 
identity (Cubitt 125).
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Nevertheless this less claustrophobic sense of identity, is perhaps more 
dangerous than the claustrophobia aroused by the body limits, in the sense 
that it erases the borders -  of identity -  thus causing a loss of orientation as 
Virilio describes:
Together with the build-up of information superhighways we are 
facing a new phenomenon: loss of orientation. A fundamental loss of 
orientation complementing and concluding the societal liberization 
and the deregulation of financial market whose nefarious effects are 
well known. A duplication of sensible reality, into reality and virtuality, 
is in the making. A stereo-reality of sorts threatens. A total loss of the 
bearings of the individual looms large. To exist, is to exist in situ, here 
and now. This is precisely what is being threatened by cyberspace and 
instantaneous, globalized information flows (par. 5).
The strength of the newly defined space stems from the simulation of 
presence; there is a thereness achieved in this hallucination, in this 
redefinition of space when one is lost in the global capillaries of the 
cyberspace. The evidence suggested by Mark Dery is interesting and relevant 
in understanding the new feeling of space arising:
Those who spend an inordinate amount of time connected by modem 
via telephone lines to virtual spaces often report a particular sensation 
of “thereness”; prowling from one electronic conference to another, 
eavesdropping on discussions in progress, bears an uncanny 
resemblance to wandering the hallways of some labyrinthine mansion, 
poking one’s head into room after room. “One of the most striking 
features of the WELL,” observed a user named loca, “is that it actually 
creates a feeling of ‘place’. I’m starting at a computer screen. But the 
feeling really is that I’m ‘in’ something; I’m some'where’” (1993: 565).
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This striking definition of experience indicates the rise of cyberspace, in 
occupying our spaces of the imaginary, while indicating on the other hand, 
the “high-tech assault on reality”, the decline of reality. The reason why we 
are more immensely embedded in virtuality every day is our growing 
detachment from reality, as Slouka puts it; our firm paces on the “road to 
unreality” (1-4).
On the road to unreality, we have gone a long way ever since Debord’s 
preoccupations regarding the way life and experience being reduced to 
spectacle. Today, the evacuation of reality seems much more rapid and 
pierce. Regarding Sheriy Turkle’s account of our relationship with 
simulations, how we “turn games into reality and reality into games”, the 
issue of “war” might be considered as a striking exemplary of the current 
condition. For a generation of teenagers and children who have witnessed the 
Gulf War, between Iraq and the United States, broadcasted live by CNN, the 
meaning of war had been altered forever. This mighty war “on-line”, had 
reduced war into “this rotten simulation”, to any other war epic, where 
everything was just fiction (Baudrillard, 1995: 59). Therefore, one should 
consider their indifference in “playing” with war, playing war games, and 
inscribed by the motto of such games: “The more deaths the better”.
James, fourteen years old, has been demonstrating his prowess at 
Platoon, a Nintendo video game. He tells me that the game pretty 
much boils down to “the more deaths the better.” I ask James how he 
feels about this. What he thinks about Platoon’s definition of success. 
James responds by clarifying how he sees the relationship between 
real and simulated war. “If you are a soldier on the ground, war is
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about killing faster than the other guy. So the game is realistic. It’s too 
bad that people die, but the idea in war is that they die and you don’t.” 
James adds: “I sort of like it that it [Platoon] rubs your nose in what 
war is about. If people think war is more glamorous than that, I think 
that’s what’s bad.”
In Turkle’s view, James’s comment clarifies the point that the 
assumptions of such games are likely to reflect our real world assumptions as 
well. James’s conviction that Platoon does well to confront us with reality 
brings us back further discussion and criticism of our reality. We go back to 
the question of “what is Real?”
The question may take many forms. What are we willing to count as 
real? What do our models allow us to see as real? To what degree are 
we willing to take simulations for reality? How do we keep a sense that 
there is a reality distinct from simulation? Would that sense be itself 
an illusion? (Turkle, 1997: 72-3).
By such means discussed above, virtual worlds represent lab)ninths that 
confront our bodies and our experiences of space with paradoxes of a new 
order. In the past, labyrinths were always spatial in conception, as they were 
metaphors of disorientation; while in “the virtual” they become meta­
labyrinths of strange knots and irrational dizziness. Full immersion in “the 
virtual” means that everything in it relates to the s)mthetic reality of 
cyberspace, and not to exterior physical space (Boyer 50).
Going back to the issue of escape that cyberspace connotes, and which 
appears to make cyberspace so new, there is the possibility that it was our
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escape, if not from the space, or from our bodies, or from our realities, but 
only from the “all-too-visible” that the city has exposed, in its being a mere 
screen with all the capitalist overflow. Maybe we were just looking for a new 
place to reinvent our fantasies, for the “obscene” did not allow for any 
imaginary space to exist. Maybe we desperately sought the invisibility that it 
offered, in which to be ourselves again, to hear our muteness, to remember 
what humanity was like.
“We tell ourselves stories in order to live,” is the opening line of Joan 
Didion’s White Album, indeed we do, or at least we have to do, for only 
stories would allow for the space of the imaginary in this technological world 
(qtd. in Dery, 1996:15). Isn’t there also the possibility that “cyberspace” is yet 
another story that we are telling ourselves? Indeed it is. For in its reduction of 
the space to little uncanny sentences of definition, of description is where we 
believe to be in a new space, a new space which we believe that we are 
delineating, where we believe we are defining the rules, and we are indeed 
obeying the rules we have created anew, we are defining ourselves a new 
order in which we can develop new disorders to be able to cope with the 
uncanny of the life itself.
In fact, cyberspace had existed long before Gibson had coined the term 
and gave it a substantial existence. We were in cyberspace when we talked on 
the phone with someone and maybe we were in cyberspace when we believed 
that the television had the “whole world in it”. We were in cyberspace when 
we forgot that the computer was only a tool in our hands, in our control, and
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believed that it was a “second self’ to us. Were we deceived or are we just 
about to be?
3.2 Can Cyberspace Be a Public Space?
The new space of interaction, folds and unfolds to make apparent a 
virtuality that people are very much embedded in, and unfolds again to 
display the illusion and fascination of it. In very crude terms, what is going 
on in cyberspace sociality is that:
The electronically disembodied are zapping E-mail around the world, 
typing messages back and forth in real-time “chat,” and flocking to 
BBS discussion topics and UseNet newsgroups. They’re lurking and 
flaming and ROTFLOL (Rolling on the Floor Laughing Out Loud). 
They’re swapping pornographic .GIFs (digitized photos) and swinging 
in anonymous “text sex” trysts. They’re mousing around the Net’s 
latest addition, the World Wide Web, a hypertext-based system that 
enables users around the globe to point and click from one multimedia 
site to another, bouncing from digitized video clips to snippets of 
sound to screenfuls of text without end (Dery, 1996: 6).
As observed by Mark Dery, and by many other authors, overwhelmingly 
growing numbers of people are convinced that “there is a there there” and 
that there is an irredeemable social life going on in the cyberspace (Barlow 
164-169). In Neuromancer. William Gibson had borrowed the phrase 
“There’s no there there”, that was coined by Gertrude Stein, who was 
speaking of Oakland. But the phrase, has turned out to be reversed today, if 
we are to concern the fact that the number of people that are convinced about
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a presence in cyberspace, and about a presence of cyberspace, is growing very 
rapidly. Strong evidence suggests that many people enjoy and are satisfied 
with this new definition of sociality, where they fulfill their needs for sociality 
and where some of the participants could even go as far as achieving tactility 
and thereby some physical ones as well. Though mainly developed for 
transmission of information, and for military purposes, the fact that these 
new technological conduits had the potential to create new kinds of 
communities was noted and encouraged by the very top leaders of the 
research projects that created it.
Before ARPANET went online in 1969, the people who had sponsored its 
initial development, J. C. R. Licklider and Robert Taylor, wrote an article 
with E. Herbert, “The Computer as a Communication Device,” in which they 
set forth their vision for the future of computer-linked communities:
Although more interactive multiaccess computer systems are being 
delivered now, and although more groups plan to be using these 
systems within the next year, there are at present perhaps only as few 
as half a dozen interactive multiaccess computer communities (in 
italics) [...] For the society, the impact will be good or bad, depending 
mainly on the question: Will “to be on-line” be a privilege or a right? If 
only a favored segment of the population gets a chance to enjoy the 
advantage of discontinuity in the spectrum of intellectual opportunity. 
[...] On the other hand, if the network idea should prove to do for 
education what a few have envisioned in hope, if not in concrete 
detailed plan, and if all minds should prove to be responsive, surely 
the boon to human kind would be beyond measure (Rheingold 76).
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Their hopeful envision of the future proved to be true -  both in the way 
that they foresaw and even in ways they wouldn’t have expected -  even 
before the actualization of the on-line communication project, with the 
cyberpunk genre that had developed into a subculture with the early 
comments on what the cyber-future would bring.
The term “cyberpunk” had first appeared as an ear-catching coinage 
borrowed from Bruce Bethke’s story of the same name, dated 1983, and was 
attributed to the “bizarre, hard-edged, high-tech” science fiction literature 
emerging in the eighties by the critic and editor Gardner Dozois in a 1984 
Washington Post article (Dery, 1996: 75).
Soon the term tore loose from its initial purpose and floated into the 
mainstream. Katie Haffner and John Markoff used the term to describe 
“young people for whom computers and computer networks are an obsession, 
and who have carried their obsession beyond what computer professionals 
consider ethical and lawmakers consider acceptable” (9).
As the term evolved, so did a new subculture, outlined by a society of 
journalists, science-fiction manifesto-makers, postmodern theorists, net 
surfers, and fans who stretched the term into strange new shapes. All the 
same, it was used as a label for electro-industrial rock with a grungy, sci-fi 
edge and it serves as a prism to refract some of cyberculture’s recurrent 
themes: the convergence of human and machine; the supersession of sensory 
experience by digital simulation; the subcultural “misuse” of high technology 
in the service of perverse sensibilities or subversive ideologies; and a
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profound ambivalence, handed down from the sixties, toward computers as 
engines of liberation and tools of social control, reweavers of the social fabric 
shredded by industrial modernism and instruments of an even greater 
atomization (Dery, 1996: 75).
To Lewis Shiner, what had once started out as a fashionable subset of 
science fiction, showing high technology subverted by opportunists on the 
margins of the society, for profit or just for fun” had become a cliché by 1987, 
losing its meaning for its founders and “escaping, virus-like, into the 
mainstream, where it continues to thrive” (A17).
Nevertheless, the edges of the cyberpunk genre extended out to cover all 
the contemporary culture; it was also appropriated to refer to music by Paul 
Moore, a software engineer who edits desktop-published “cyberpunk 
/electronic /techno /noise fanzine” called Technology Works, “cyberpunk” 
best describes the folk music of cyberculture. “I appropriated the term from 
science fiction and applied it to this music because, although nobody seemed 
to be talking about these bands in terms of a movement, there seemed to be a 
link between cyberpunk’s hard-edged writing style and the edgy music made 
by bands like Clock DVA, Front 242, and Skinny Puppy,” he says. “In a 
musical sense, [cyberpunk] means using electronics to express yourself. You 
don’t have to be a traditional musician to program machines and get some 
music out of them. Cyberpunk music is about using high technology to 
express a ‘street’ sensibility” (Dery, 1996: 80).
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This gathering around the cyberpunk genre and the possession of the 
term by many as a subculture, gave early signs of the newly emerging 
cybercommunities that appeared with the network of relationships that were 
lived on-line, in a parallel computer era.
The idea of a cybercommunity is mainly predicated on the sense of 
cyberspace as an actual place. This perception of the conferencees, as Stone 
calls them, or the MUDders, is based on an idea of virtual thereness indeed. 
Members of electronic virtual communities act as if the community met in a 
physical public space. The number of times that on-line conferencees refer to 
the conference as an architectural place and to the mode of interaction in that 
place as being social is, overwhelmingly high in proportion to those who do 
not. They say things like, “This is a nice place to get together” or “This is a 
convenient place to meet” (1991:104).
Besides their being perceived as such, there is also the point that the 
virtual space is most frequently visualized as Cartesian. On-line conferencees 
tend to visualize the conference system as a three-dimensional space that can 
be mapped in terms of Cartesian coordinates. And yet, conferencees act as if 
the virtual space was inhabited by bodies. Conferencees construct bodies on­
line by describing them, either spontaneously or in response to questions, 
and articulate their discourses around this assumption. This demonstrates 
not only their ability to perceive of selves in delegated agencies, and also that 
they seem to have no difficulty addressing, befriending, and developing fairly 
complex relationships with the delegated agents of other conferencees.
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Electronic virtual communities represent flexible, lively, and practical 
adaptations to the real circumstances that confront persons seeking 
community. They are part of a range of innovative solutions to the drive for 
sociality -  a drive that can be frequently thwarted by the geographical and 
cultural realities of cities increasingly structured according to the needs of 
powerful economic interests rather than in ways that encourage and facilitate 
habitation and social interaction in the urban context. In this context, 
electronic virtual communities are complex and ingenious strategies for 
survival.
Nonetheless, what constitutes the similarity between the effects of the city 
and the cyberspace, on the identity of the individual, in the form of a threat is 
highlighted by Stone:
The distinction between inside and outside has been erased and along 
with it the possibility of privacy (105).
According to Stone, the origin of cyberspace goes far back to 1669, to 
Robert Boyle’s academic paper that allowed for virtual witnessing (86). He 
created what he called a “community of likeminded gentleman” to validate 
his scientific experiments, and he correctly surmised that the “gentlemen” for 
whom he was writing believed that boring, detailed writing implied 
painstaking experimental work. Consequently it came to pass that boring 
writing was likely to indicate scientific truth. By means of such writing, a 
group of people was able to “witness” an experiment without being physically 
present. Thus in the very early idea of a virtual community, texts became 
ways of creating new kinds of communities.
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Later evolution of virtual communities owed a great deal to the invention 
of telegraph and the radio that gathered musical communities around the 
phonograph, removing the community from the physical public space of the 
concert hall, and shifting to a new kind of virtual communal space. Perhaps 
even more apparent than the music communities, in this era, was the 
community that joined and enjoyed Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “fireside 
chats”. Instead of talking to a few hundred representatives, Roosevelt used 
the radio as a tool for fitting listeners into his living room. The radio was one­
way communication, but because of it people were able to experience 
presence in a different way. This view implies a new, different, and complex 
way of experiencing the relationship between the physical human body and 
the “I” that inhabits it. Roosevelt did not physically enter listeners’ living 
rooms. He invited instead the listeners into his. In a sense, the listener was in 
two places at once -  the body at home, but the delegate, the “I” that belonged 
to the body, in an imaginary space with another person (Stone, 1991: 87).
With the computer, or with the era of information technology, the first 
virtual communities based on information technology were the first 
computer, terminal-based bulletin board systems (BBSs). The on-line BBSs 
were named after their perceived function -  virtual places, conceived to be 
just like physical bulletin boards, where people could post notes for general 
reading.
Within a few months of the first BBS’s appearance, a San Francisco group 
headed by John James, a programmer and a visionary thinker, had developed 
the idea that the BBS was a virtual community, a community that promised
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radical transformation of existing society and the emergence of new social 
forms. “The CommuniTree Group”, as they called themselves, envisioned the 
BBS to be an extension of the participant’s instrumentality into a virtual 
social space. They proposed a new kind of BBS, which they called a tree- 
structured conference, employing as a working metaphor both the binary tree 
protocols in computer science and also the organic qualities of trees as such 
appropriate to the 1970s. Each branch of the tree was to be a separate 
conference that grew naturally out of its root message by virtue of each 
subsequent message that was attached to it.
The conferences saw themselves not primarily as readers of bulletin 
boards or participants in a novel discourse but as agents of a new kind of 
social experiment. When asked how sitting alone at a terminal was a social 
act, they explained that they saw the terminal as a window into a social space. 
When describing the act of communication, many moved their hands 
expressively as though typing, emphasizing the gestural quality and essential 
tactility of the virtual mode. Also present in their descriptions was a 
propensity to reduce other expressive modalities to the tactile. It seemed 
clear that, from the beginning, the electronic virtual mode possessed the 
power to overcome its character of single-mode transmission and limited 
bandwidth.
Habitat, designed by Chip Morningstar and Randall Farmer, was a large- 
scale social experiment that was accessible through such common telephone­
line computer networks as Tymnet. Habitat existed first as a 35-foot mural 
located in a building in Sausalito, California, but, on-line, each area of the
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mural represents an entirely expandable area in cyberspace, be it a forest, a 
plain, or a city. Habitat is inhabitable in that, when the user signs on, he or 
she has a window into the ongoing social life of the cyberspace -  the 
community “inside” the computer. The social space is represented by a 
cartoonlike frame. The virtual person who is the user’s delegated agency is 
represented by a cartoon figure that may be customized from a menu of body 
parts. When the user wishes his/her character to speak, s/he types out the 
words on the Commodore’s keyboard, and these appear in a speech balloon 
over the head of the user’s character. The speech balloon is visible to any 
other user nearby in the virtual space. The user sees whatever other people 
are in the immediate vicinity in the form of other figures.
Fig. 10. The Chatroom Bar Scene, by The Motion Factory (1996).
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Habitat is a two-dimensional example of what William Gibson called a 
“consensual hallucination”. First according to Morningstar and Farmer, it has 
well-known protocols for encoding and exchanging information. By generally 
accepted usage among cyberspace engineers, this means it is consensual. This 
simulation software uses agents that can transform information to simulate 
environment. This means it is a hallucination.
Thus in the era of the Habitat, the participants of electronic communities 
seem to be acquiring skills that are useful for the virtual social environments 
developing in the late twentieth century technologized nations. Their 
participants have learned to delegate their agency to body-representatives 
that exist in an imaginary space contiguously with representatives of other 
individuals.
The single most significant event for the development of the next stage in 
virtual communities was the publication of William Gibson’s science fiction 
novel Neuromancer. Neuromancer represents the dividing line between the 
previous ideas of virtual community and the new, not because it signaled any 
technological development, but because it crystallized a new community.
Neuromancer reached the hackers who had been radicalized by George 
Lucas’s powerful cinematic evocation of humanity and technology infinitely 
extended, and it reached the technologically literate and socially disaffected 
who were searching for social forms that could transform the fragmented 
anomie that characterized life in Silicon Valley, and all the electronic 
industrial ghettos. In a single stroke, Gibson’s powerful vision provided for
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them the imaginary public sphere and refigured discursive community that 
established the grounding for the possibility of a new kind of social 
interaction.
The three-dimensional inhabitable cyberspace described in Neuromancer 
does not yet exist, but the groundwork for it can be found in a series of 
experiments in both the military and private sectors. During the period, when 
Neuromancer was published, “virtual reality” acquired a new name and a 
suddenly prominent identity as “cyberspace”. The critical importance of 
Gibson’s book was the way that it triggered a conceptual revolution among 
the scattered workers who had been doing virtual reality research for years: 
As task groups coalesced and dissolved, as the fortunes of companies and 
projects and laboratories rose and fell, the existence of Gibson’s novel and the 
technological and social imaginary that it articulated enabled the researchers 
in virtual reality -  or under the new dispensation, cyberspace -  to recognize 
and organize themselves as a community.
Parallel to these electronic communities were the MUDs, MUSEs 
(Multiple-User Simulation Environments), MUSHes (Multiple-User Social 
Hosts) and MOOs (MUD Object-Oriented). All were generalized under the 
name of MUDs, Multi-User Domains, or with greater historical accuracy, 
Multi-User Dungeons, because of their genealogy from Dungeons and 
Dragons, the fantasy role-playing game that had swept high schools and 
colleges in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Turkle, 1998: 7). The first MUDs, 
developed in the late 1970s, were multiplayer fantasy games of the dungeons- 
and-dragons variety. In 1989, a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon
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University named James Aspnes decided to see what would happen if you 
took away the monsters and the magic of the swords out of the game and 
instead let people extend the virtual world. Thus people’s main activity, that 
was trying to conquer the virtual world in Dungeons and Dragons, went from 
trying to conquer to trying to build it collaboratively (Bruckman 173).
Your character, Buffy Mojo, is crawling through a maze of tunnels in 
the dungeon of her archenemy’s castle. The walls are dank, the lighting 
is dim, and the silence is ominous. A spell has turned Buffy’s only ally 
into a toad. Your hands feel clammy on the keyboard; your heartbeat 
seems too loud. If Buffy runs into the wrong character down here, your 
persona will die, and hundreds of hours of work you put into 
constructing her will have been wasted. More than just your imaginary 
character is at stake. Buffy’s fate will influence virtual lives of other 
characters that represent real friends in the material world. You are in 
a MUD, along with the tens of thousands of others around the world 
who build fantasy worlds in the Net (145).
The description above, by Rheingold, is a typical example of what a MUD 
might look like and what the experience of it might be like. “Welcome to the 
wild side of cyberspace culture, where magic is real and identity is fluid,” 
Rheingold greets us. More and more people are involved every day with this 
experience of a play of identities and magic of life, while many others 
wonder what is so appealing to this experience. “What is the matter with 
these people?” is a question that many people ask when they first learn about 
MUDding. “Don’t they have lives?” (146). This is the most serious question 
arising from the brief history of the medium so far -  is this a dangerous form 
of addiction? The strongest case for the possibility that computer mediated 
communication might present grave social dangers as well as opportunities
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stems from the documented instances of MUDders who spend most of their 
waking lives in their alternate worlds.
What are the unique features of this medium that appeal to people 
psychologically, and what does that say about people’s psychological needs? 
The answer might be lying in the changing notions of identity that we have 
traced beginning from the built environment and ranging into the social, 
that were precipitated with the changing technologies. Some people are 
primed for the kind of communication saturation that MUDs offer because 
of the communication-saturated environments that have occupied their 
attention since birth. MUDs are part of the latest phase in a long sequence of 
mental changes brought about by the invention and widespread use of 
symbolic tools.
Similar to the way previous media dissolved social boundaries related to 
time and space, the latest in the computer-mediated communications media 
seems to dissolve boundaries of identity as well. One of the outstanding 
characteristics of MUDs, is pretending to be somebody else, or even, 
pretending to be several different people at the same time.
Some people seem to use these depersonalized modes of communication 
to get very personal with each other. For these people, at the right times, 
computer-mediated communication is a way to connect with another human 
being. But the authenticity of human relationships is always in question in 
cyberspace, because of the masking and distancing of the medium, in a way 
that it is not in question in real life. The grammar* of MUD life involves a
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syntax of identity play: new identities, false identities, multiple identities, 
exploratory identities, are what are available in different manifestations of 
the medium.
Identity is the first thing you create in a MUD. You have to decide the 
name of your alternate identity -  what MUDders call your character. And 
you have to describe who this character is, for the benefit of the other people 
who inhabit the same MUD. By creating your identity, you help create a 
world. Your character’s role and the roles of the others who play with you are 
part of the architecture of belief that upholds for everybody in the MUD the 
illusion of being a wizard in a castle or a navigator aboard a starship: the 
roles give people new stages on which to exercise new identities, and their 
new identities affirm the reality of the scenario.
Unlike computer conferencing systems or bulletin boards, people’s social 
interactions are in different varieties of real-time chat mode, not the kind of 
bulletin-board style communication you can find on BBSs or alike. MUDs 
are very much about who is in the place at the same time and how they 
interact. In MUDs, unlike computer conferencing systems or ordinary chat 
services, participants also create objects with powers, such as magic carpets 
that transport their owners to secret parts of the kingdom (Rheingold 149). 
Other participants can buy or steal these carpets; people can gain power to 
make even more useful carpets, but only after amassing sufficient knowledge 
of the m u d ’s lore as well as formal mastery of the MUDs’ world-building 
languages and meeting certain challenges. Gaining the power to modiiy the
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environment in which the game takes place is a primary goal for newcomers 
in both the “adventure” and “social” MUDs.
Another difference between the MUDs and the BBSs or other chat 
programs is that, when you log off from the WELL, all you leave is the words 
you have posted. When you log off a MUD, many of the dwellings you have 
built, the cities that you have constructed, the tools and the toys, and the 
weapons that you have created, can be explored or used by other people.
In a MUD, you are communicating with other people elsewhere on the 
net, via your characters, but you are also playing a role and learning your 
way around a world where knowledge of how that world works can translate 
into power over the other inhabitants. For example, you can gain the power 
of invisibility, which gives you the ability to spy on other conversations. One 
notorious trick in less reputable corners of the MUD universe is to talk 
somebody into going to a dark corner of a MUD for some tinysex -  dirty 
talking via computer screen. Net.sleazing, as the practice of aggressively 
soliciting mutual narrative simulation is also known, which is an unsavory 
but perennially popular behavior in MUDland. Tinysex, net.sleazing and 
gender deception are aspects of MUDs and computer-mediated 
communication worth examining, but it’s a mistake to stereotype the very 
broad range of MUD behavior with images of its most sophomoric elements.
The single largest category of MUDders are college students, aged 
between seventeen to twenty-three, and the particular uses they find for this 
technology, identity play and sexual innuendo, reflect the preoccupations of
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that population. But not all undergraduate MUDders are immature, nor are 
all MUDders undergraduates. For many, a MUD is a place where they feel 
more comfortable in some ways than they do in the real world.
Turkle wrote about the behavior of young, compulsive computer 
programmers that seems to offer a key to understanding MUDding’s 
addictive potential. Turkle focused on the notion of mastery as a crucial 
missing element in the lives of these young people:
The issue of mastery has an important role in the development of each 
individual. For the developing child, there is a point, usually at the 
start of the school years, when mastery takes on a privileged, central 
role. It becomes the key to autonomy, to the growth of confidence in 
one’s ability to move beyond the world of parents to the world of peers. 
Later, when adolescence begins, with new sexual pressures and new 
social demands from peers and parents, mastery can provide respite. 
The safe microworlds the child master built -  the microworlds of 
sports, chess, cars, literature, or mathematical expertise -  can become 
places of escape. ... But for some the issues that arise during 
adolescence are so threatening that the safe place is never abandoned. 
Sexuality is too threatening to be embraced. Intimacy with other 
people is unpredictable to the point of being intolerable. As we grow 
up, we forge our identities by building on the last place in 
psychological development where we felt safe. As a result, many 
people come to define themselves in terms of competence, in terms of 
what they can control.
Pride in one’s ability to master a medium is a positive thing. But if the 
sense of self becomes defined in terms of those things over which one 
can exert perfect control, the world of safe things becomes severely 
limited -  because those things tend to be things, not people. Mastery
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can cease to be a growing force in individual development and take on 
another face. It becomes a way of masking fears about the self and the 
complexities of the world beyond. People can become trapped (qtd. in 
Rheingold 153).
The ability to create places and puzzles for others to explore, is a form of 
mastery, a way for people who might lack social status in their real-world 
community to gain status in their alternate community. For people whose 
lives are controlled by parents, or professors or bosses, there is a certain 
attraction to a world where mastery and the admiration of peers is available 
to anyone with imagination and intellectual curiosity.
In MUDworlds, description is the same as creation. MUDs are evidence 
that text still has its powers, even in this highly visual era. When you weave 
text into the kind of interactive landscape that computer models provide, you 
can build a kind of magic into the environment. Hence, the roots of MUDs 
are deep in the part of human nature that delights in storytelling and playing 
“let’s pretend”. Brenda Laurel, in Computers As Theatre, claims that the 
strong identification players feel with artificial characters in a computer 
database is an example of the same human capacity for mimesis to which 
Aristotle attributed the “soul-changing” power of drama (112).
Narrative is the stuff of which MUDworlds are made. Everyone and 
everything and every place has a story. Eveiy object in a MUD, from your 
character’s identity to the chair your character is sitting in, has a written 
description that is revealed when you choose to look at the object -  where 
look is a command, that brings out the textual descriptions of all the objects
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and identities in the MUDworld. The story is known in MUDspeak as “the 
description”. If you have the authorization to do so, you could create a small 
brown mouse or a purple mountain range or whatever else words can 
describe. Although the MUDworlds are fantasies, with no more tangible 
reality than the settings and characters in a novel or a soap opera, the 
inhabitants of these MUDlands are deeply immensed into a reality of this 
virtuality.
People who join virtual communities today are rarely given any set of 
formal rules for the finer points of on-line relationships, like the possibility of 
identity deception. Although the technology of computer-mediated 
communications provides the instrument of deception, the special 
importance we place on gender roles and prevalence of swindlers in a 
population are both rooted in social questions that extend far beyond the 
technology that brings them into focus. The opportunity for deception, 
however, is designed into the medium all the same. And the peril on the edge 
of the cyberspace blinks at us through the significant embeddedness of this 
feature.
On the track of a non-linear relationship between the identity that was 
embedded in corporeality once -  now an illusion -  and the current switches 
between different on-line personae and alternate identities in MUDs and the 
alike, the human celebrates joyfully the ultimate penetration of the outside 
from without, and the extreme porosity of the inside.
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It is not as simple as it may seem in the first instant. This is the ultimate 
merge of the real and the virtual that merge completely until they dissolve 
again in the fantasyland. This is the merge of the inside with the other, the 
other with the self such that even they are no longer separable.
When Turkle says, “We are able to step through the looking glass,” this is 
her concern (1998: 5). We step into the land of pure fantasy, but no longer by 
ourselves. We are there with the other, the other of ourselves. We are there to 
give birth to the other, to create our other and live with it. “We are learning to 
live in virtual worlds”.
Among the all too many “boundary stories” of creating the other in 
cyberspace, perhaps the one which most strikingly affronts us with what is 
going on, is the case of Julie accounted by Stone; which Stone claims is a 
“wonderful example of the war of desire and technology” (1995: 75).
Julie Graham started on a women’s discussion group on CompuServe, in 
New York in 1982. She had described herself as a New York 
neuropsychologist, who was a totally disabled older woman, but she could 
push the keys of a computer with her headstick. The personality she projected 
into the “net” -  the vast electronic web that links computers all over the 
world -  was huge. Julie’s disability was invisible and irrelevant. Her standard 
greeting was a big, expansive “HI!!!!!” Her heart was a big as her greeting, 
and in the computer intimate electronic companionships that can develop 
during on-line conferencing between people who may never physically meet, 
Julie’s women friends shared their deepest troubles, and she offered them
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advice -  advice that changed their lives. Trapped inside her ruined body, 
Julie herself was sharp and perceptive, thoughtful and caring.
She had made an enormous number of friends on the Net, with whom she 
had deep friendships, but who never saw her in real life, since she had told 
them that in addition to her disability, her face had been severely disfigured 
to the extent that plastic surgery was unable to restore her appearance and 
consequently she never saw anyone in person. The others on the chat system 
had occasional parties, at which those who lived in reasonable geographical 
proximity would gather to exchange a few socialities in biological mode, but 
Julie assiduously avoided these, instead she ramped up her social profile on 
the net even further. She also took it upon herself to ferret pretenders in the 
chat system, in particular men who masqueraded as women. She was not shy 
about warning women about the dangers of letting one’s guard down on the 
net. “Remember to be careful,” she would say, “things may not be as they 
seem” (Stone, 1995: 72). Moreover, she was a bisexual, from time to time 
coming on to the men and women with whom she talked. In fact, as time 
went on, she became flamboyantly sexual. Eventually she was encouraging 
many of her friends to engage in cybersex with her.
After several years, something happened that shook the conference to the 
core. Julie did not exist. She was, it turned out, a middle-aged male 
psychiatrist called Sanford Lewin. Logging onto the conference for the first 
time, he had accidentally begun a discussion with a woman who mistook him 
for another woman. “I was stunned,” he said later, “at the conversational 
mode. I hadn’t known that women talked among themselves that way. There
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was so much more vulnerability, so much more depth and complexity. Men’s 
conversations on the nets were much more guarded and superficial, even 
among intimates. It was fascinating and I wanted more. And then I thought 
to myself, here’s a terrific opportunity to help people, by catching them when 
their normal defenses are down and they are more able to hear what they 
need to hear” (Stone, 1995: 70). He had spent weeks developing the right 
persona. A totally disabled, single older woman was perfect. He felt that such 
a person wouldn’t be expected to have a social life. Consequently her 
existence only as a net persona would seem natural. It worked for years, until 
one of Julie’s devoted admirers, bent on finally meeting her in person, 
tracked her down.
The news reverberated through the net. Reactions varied from humorous 
resignation to blind rage. Most deeply affected were the women who had 
shared their innermost feelings with Julie. “I felt raped,” said one of Julie’s 
friends, “I felt that my deepest secrets had been violated.” Several went so far 
as to repudiate the genuine gains they had made in their personal and 
emotional lives. They felt those gains were predicated on deceit and trickery.
There was yet another side to the Julie story. Sanford Lewin, when he 
began to realize that things were getting a little out of hand, and when he got 
a little nervous about the turns Julie’s life was taking and her tremendous 
personal growth. Apparently he had never expected the impersonation to 
succeed so dramatically. He thought he would make a few contacts on-line, 
and maybe offer some helpful advice to some women. What had happened 
instead was that he had found himself deeply engaged in developing a whole
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new part of himself that he had never known existed. His responses had long 
since ceased to be a masquerade; with the help of the on-line mode and a 
certain amount of textual prosthetics, he was in the process of becoming 
Julie. Not that he was losing his identity, but he was certainly developing a 
parallel one, one of considerable puissance. Lewin began to realize the 
enormity of his deception. This was what Stone evaluated as, “Sometimes a 
person’s on-line persona becomes so finely developed that it begins to take 
over their life off the net” (1991; 84).
If the information age is an extension of the industrial age, with the 
passage of time the split between the body and the subject is growing more 
pronounced still. But in the epoch of Neuromancer. the split is 
simultaneously growing and disappearing. The socioepistemic mechanism by 
which bodies mean is undergoing a deep restructuring in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, finally fulfilling the furthest extent of the isolation of those 
bodies through which its domination is authorized and secured. The 
boundaries between the subject, if not the body, and the “rest of the world” 
are undergoing a radical refiguration, brought about in part through the 
mediation of technology.
But this occurs under a new definition of public and private: one in which 
warrantability is irrelevant, spectacle is plastic and negotiated, and desire no 
longer grounds itself in physicality. Under these conditions, one might ask, 
will the future inhabitants of cyberspace catch the engineers’ societal 
imperative to construct desire in gendered, binary terms -  coded into the 
virtual body descriptors -  or will they find more appealing the possibilities of
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difference unconstrained by relationships of dominance and submission? 
Partly this will depend upon how “cyberspaceians” engage with the virtual 
body (Stone, 1991:106).
“Space may be the final frontier, but it’s all made in a Hollywood 
basement” goes the lyrics of a popular song by Red Hot Chilli Peppers, named 
Californication. The way that it is reduced to imagery, the way that it is being 
imposed on us is clear even in the lyrics of a song. Then in this reduction of 
space, cyberspace has its share again, being a catalyzing agent in formulating 
a new sense of space, even if space is not at all made, “in a Hollywood 
basement”, it is still more or less as a scenery of a movie shot.
Going back to Gibson’s Neuromancer once again, the way three- 
dimensional space is configured in the novel had lead the way to imagine the 
new life that the future might bring. As previously observed, virtual worlds 
are not burdened by the structural dictates of the real world. Virtual worlds 
are not subject to the principles of ordinary space and time (Holtzman 47). 
The space for fantasy is the fundamental of cyberspace, or in other words 
cyberspace is pure fantasy. As Michael Benedikt explains:
In patently unreal and artificial realities ... the principles of ordinary 
space and time can ... be violated with impunity. After all, the ancient 
worlds of magic, myth and legend to which cyberspace is heir, as well 
as the modern worlds of fantasy fiction, movies, and cartoons, are 
replete with violations of the logic of everyday space and time: 
disappearances, underworlds, phantoms, warp speed travel, mirrors 
and doors to alternate worlds, zero gravity, flattenings and
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reconstructions, wormholes, scale inversions, and so on. And after all, 
why have cyberspace if we cannot apparently bend nature’s rules 
there? (128).
So once again, cyberspace comes both as a threat to, and a tool for the 
rules of the nature and for changing those rules, to look at them from a new 
perspective.
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4. VIRTUALITY IN FANTASY, FANTASY IN VIRTUALITY
4.1 Human Desire, Human Identity -  Delineating Fantasy
The already porous human subject of the modern, standing every now and 
then, at the edge of schizophrenia, has yet confronted a new era of being 
digitalized, achieving an even painful “electronic porosity” (Stone, 1995:166). 
However destructive it sounds, on the path of the all-too-visible of the urban 
and the invisible of the cyber -  and back again, the pendulum of the human 
comes out of the battle defeated, and all the same victorious. On the eyes 
blazed by the brilliant yellow glow of the computer screen, there is yet 
another glow to be read, one of reclaiming back the space in which to dream, 
to fantasize. This recognition of the space for dreaming is a mirage in the 
midst of all the threat on the human identity. Drawing on Turkle’s argument 
in The Second Self, this is a space necessary for the identity to be reclaimed; 
Turkle characterizes computers as intimate machines and at the same time, 
as the new location for dreaming, which is a central identity formation 
process (qtd. in Hakken 87).
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The early identification by Turkle, of the computer as a “second self’, was 
a consideration that identity-transforming relationships were almost always 
“one-to-one, a person alone with a machine”. Turkle admits, as we all do, 
today this is no longer the case.
A rapidly expanding system of networks, collectively known as the 
Internet, links millions of people in new spaces that are changing the 
way we think, the nature of our sexuality, the form of our 
communities, our very identities. ...Beyond [the level of computer 
being a tool], the computer offers us both new models of mind and a 
new medium on which to project our ideas and fantasies. Most 
recently, the computer has become even more than tool and mirror. 
We are able to step through the looking glass (1998: 5).
Cyberspace and all the idea of global network, of connectedness, of the 
proximity of everything that penetrates the human without resistance; allows 
to draw one more possibility, while it announces the condition of the human 
subject as schizophrenic. Once the “shock” of the superfluous identity is 
taken care of, the human subject is now free to remember what s/he forgot 
with the rigid and the unbendable of the modern urban space and the 
modern culture: the play. Inherent in all the “boundary” stories of identity in 
cyberspace, is the play, the play of identities. In fact, this is the uppermost 
sensation of cyberspace, experienced by means of the invisible of the 
ephemeral. The idea that the body is abandoned and the human 
disembodied, disregards this one last hope for the human, the possibility of 
play -  or fantasy -  brought back by the cyber-, and the stubborn fact that any 
escape from the body must always be followed by a fall -  back into the 
corporeality of the body. As Stone reminds us, “No matter how virtual the
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subject may become, there is always a body attached. It may be off 
somewhere else -  and that ‘somewhere else’ may be a privileged point of view 
-  but consciousness remains firmly rooted in the physical” (1991: ill).
But on the fall back to the body, still the fantasy of the escape persists. In 
this sense, cyberspace ironically transforms itself from the latest and deepest 
threat of technology, to a new role, that of being a new possibility for survival 
from the all-too-visible of technology. It deploys an interval in which to 
breathe, for the subject of the urban space lost in the humdrum of daily life in 
the city, in which s/he can deny any reality that tackles, that obstacles, and in 
the end that belongs to the physical order.
This other dimension of the escape is the most apparent in the MUDs -  
the Multi-User Domains -  of communication, which are the closest to the 
cyberspace in Gibson’s definition that we have at the moment.
In exploring this sense of escape from the “earthly reality”, Jenkins’s 
comparison of the situation to the craze of fandom proves helpful in 
understanding why these fictional worlds are so popular. In Textual 
Poachers. Television Fans and Participatory Culture. Hemy^  Jenkins analyzes 
fan culture with an emphasis on fan reading and writing practices. Like 
MUDs, the world of fandom is an alternative reality that many participants 
find more compelling than their mundane lives. The conclusion of Textual 
Poachers is called “In My Weekend-Only World...”: Reconsidering Fandom,” 
and begins with this epigraph from a fan writer:
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In an hour of make-believe 
In these warm convention halls 
My mind is free to think 
And feels so deeply 
An intimacy never found 
Inside their silent walls 
In a year or more 
Of what they call reality
In my weekend-only world,
That they call make-believe,
Are those who share 
The visions that I see 
In their real-time life 
That they tell me is real.
The things they care about
Aren’t real to me. (qtd. in Rheingold 168).
Jenkins writes about the fan folk song “Weekend-Only World” that it 
“expresses the fans’ recognition that fandom offers not so much of an escape 
from reality as an alternative reality whose values may be more humane and 
democratic than those held by mundane society.” The author of the song 
“gains power and identity from the time she spends within fan culture; 
fandom allows her to maintain her sanity in the face of the indignity and 
alienation of everyday life.
Thus in the visibility and intimacy of all, where the play is lost, cyberspace 
brings back fantasy by its way of “veiling” the apparent once again. Turkle 
highlights one more point, when she reclaims hysteria, which Baudrillard 
rejects in today’s world. Nevertheless, Turkle makes her point on hysteria, the
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neurosis of Freud’s time, claiming “today we suffer [hysteria] not less but 
differently.” The human subject of our day, terrified of being alone, yet all the 
same afraid of intimacy, experiences widespread feelings of emptiness, of 
disconnection, of the unreality of self. At this point computer enters the realm 
as a companion without emotional demands and offers a compromise. Taking 
the helping hand of the computer -  and the whole world behind the screen, 
“you can be a loner, but never alone”; “you can interact, but need never feel 
vulnerable to another person” (1984; 307).
In a single stroke, in a flashback, cyberspace gives back an old fantasy of 
the ideal. Remembering the nineteenth century Romantics through a Neu- 
romancer concern, instead of a quest for an idealized person, we take 
computer as a second self. The Romantics, in the nineteenth century, wanted 
to escape rationalist egoism by becoming one with the nature. The “console 
cowboys” of Gibson’s Neuromancer -  or in a more common terminology, 
hackers -  find soul in the machine, they lose themselves in the idea of mind 
building mind and in the sense of merging their minds with a universal 
system. When nineteenth century Romantics looked for an alternative to the 
mechanism and competition society, they looked to a perfect society of two, 
“perfect friendship,” or “perfect love”. This desire for fusion has its echo 
today, although in a new and troubling form.
This desire claims another view on the abandoning of the body, this time 
abandoning the body becomes a yearn for being part of a collective mind. 
This somehow religious connotation is in fact very much technological. The
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case of Case, the protagonist of Neuromancer. is very precise about his desire, 
of being disembodied, of belonging to the order of ephemeral.
Having this concern in mind, Dery reads Neuromancer as a “lengthy 
meditation on the mind-body split in cyberculture” (1996: 248). He is 
affirmed indeed by Gibson himself, who asserts, “the key to [the protagonist] 
Case’s personality is [his] estrangement from his body, the meat” (Rudy 170).
Indeed the idea, the notion, the ideal of cyberspace, the whole schema of 
escape takes its leverage from the mind-body duality. Slenderly appearing 
under the skin, is the pulse to “get rid of the meat” to merge with the matrix 
out there (Sobchack qtd. in Dery, 1996: 310). Borrowing from Dery again, “If 
religion is the opiate of the masses and Marxism the opiate of the intellectual, 
then cyberspace is the opiate of the twenty-first-century schizoid man, 
polarized between mind and body” (1996: 252).
Case exemplifies what Andrew Ross has called the “technocolonization of 
the body” (qtd. in Dery, 1996: 250). Bodies like every square foot of public 
space and the natural environment are corporate property in Neuromancer’s 
near-future dystopia. For an accurate reading of this dystopia, and an 
illumination of any sense of fantasy that it may offer. Case is worth 
dichotomizing.
Case is an outlaw hacker for hire, a thief with bad fortune, an information 
rustler, who had once “worked for other, wealthier thieves, employers who 
provided the exotic software required to penetrate the bright walls of
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corporate systems, opening windows into rich fields of data.” His body is a 
spent shell, his mind elsewhere -lost in memories of his exploits as a hotshot 
console cowboy, when he used a brain socket to physically connect his 
nervous system to a “custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied 
consciousness” (5) into the “neon-streaked” matrix, where “data abstracted 
from the banks of every computer in the human system appear as towers, 
cubes, and pyramids in a virtual reality version of Le Corbusier’s Radiant 
City”. (Gibson, 1984:5;51).
For him, the flesh is literally toxic: In a moment of weakness, he had made 
the classic mistake, the one he had sworn he would never make, he had stolen 
from his employers, and in return, they had “damaged his nervous system 
with a wartime Russian mycotoxin,” rendering him physically unable to 
“jack” into cyberspace:
For Case, who’d lived for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace, it was 
the Fall. In the bars he’d frequented as a cowboy hotshot, the elite 
stance involved a certain relaxed contempt for the flesh. The body was 
meat. Case fell into the prison of his own flesh (Gibson, 1984: 6).
To his rescue, comes a former “meat puppet” -  prostitute -  Molly, who is 
strongly aided by costly cosmetic surgery, contacting him for reasons even 
unknown to her, in order to employ him to crack the security programs of an 
enigmatic artificial intelligence. His mysterious new employers restore Case 
to his previous cyberspace compatibility. They, nevertheless blackmail him, 
using his strong desire for “the bodiless exultation of cyberspace”; if he 
succeeds in the crack, the slowly dissolving toxin sacs that they have planted
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in his arteries will be removed, enabling him to be in the cyberspace as he 
wishes, if he fails, they will melt to return him to his fallen state.
The world Case inhabits in Neuromancer. was an age of affordable beauty 
where money could buy a “blandly handsome blend of pop faces” or 
“shoulders bulging with grafted muscle”, or eternal youth, or even practical 
immortality:
Julius Deane was one hundred and thirty-five years old, his 
metabolism assiduously warped by a weekly fortune in serums and 
hormones. His primaiy hedge against aging was a yearly pilgrimage to 
Tokyo, where genetic surgeons re-set the code of his DNA. ... Then 
he’d fly to Hongkong and order the year’s suits and shirts. ... He 
affected prescription lenses, framed in spidery gold, ground from thin 
slabs of pink synthetic quartz and beveled like the mirrors in a 
Victorian dollhouse (12).
Case’s rescue agent Molly, was a technological construct, a cyborg:
She held out her hands, palms up, the white fingers slightly 
spread, and with a barely audible click, ten double edged, four- 
centimeter scalpel blades slid from their housings beneath the 
burgundy nails (25).
She settled back beside him. “It’s 2:43:12 A.M., Case. Got a 
readout chipped into my optic nerve” (32).
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And quite ironically, she had eye transplants and she could see in the 
dark.
This is only nominally science fiction, for Gibson, resurrects current 
trends of our contemporaneity in Neuromancer. He sets foot into each and 
every square of the grid of ouv fantasies and gazes at all the invisible of our 
imaginary, bringing out the dystopia out of our technologies. And from his 
point of view it looks dystopic indeed.
However, considering today’s world, the obsession with the body, the 
“body beautiful”, and the representation transcending the original to such an 
extent that it is no longer possible to talk of representation; the slim hope for 
abandoning the body, leaving it behind does not come as a surprise. It is a 
rebel to the order of the real, which surrounds and penetrates the individual 
in the medium of the city, of the communication. The so-called liberation of 
the body, which was the case, in the last century, had thrust back, the body 
became more obvious than ever before, as today media spurts us images of 
perfect body, and the primary issue on our agenda appears to be achieving 
that body through diets and sports and all. As in the example of bodybuilding 
that Dery suggests; the way that the liberation movement of the body thrust 
back is obvious and the last attempts to make the human belong to his/her 
body fail sadly though they erase any possibility of abandoning the body 
completely:
Bodybuilding represents a last-ditch attempt to hold the body together 
at a time when genetic engineering and the Human Genome Project
129
remind us, disconcertingly, that a human being is “little more than a 
cloud of information,” to borrow Thomas Mine’s memorable phrase 
(1996: 260).
Thus human falls back into the prison of the flesh. Nevertheless alienated 
and irritated:
For nearly a century, modern culture has sought to liberate the human 
body, to set it free in particular from the sexual phobias, silences, and 
prejudices of earlier eras. Yet a great chasm exists between modern 
images of the body and bodily experience. Just as few soldiers taste the 
movie pleasures of ripping other bodies apart, marketable images of 
sexual pleasure have very little to do with real lovers’ sexual 
experience. Few films show two elderly naked people making love, nor 
naked fat people; movie sex is great the first time. The imageiy of 
bodily pleasure in the mass media supposes a flight from one’s own 
body (Sennett, 1994: 60).
What underlies the alienation is a strong notion of “body beautiful” 
imposed on human, especially on women ever since the patriarchal culture, 
penetrating ever fortified into our day. Technology had one subtler objective, 
brought about by culture, to bear on women’s bodies in the service of male 
fantasies:
The corset produced the heaving bosom of romance novels even as it 
hindered respiration, restricted mobility, and rearranged the internal 
organs; the bustle thrust the buttocks up and back, approximating “the 
posture of a female animal in heat” (Dery, 1996: 237-8).
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The remodeling of the female body in accordance with bourgeois ideals 
did not end with the passing of the corset and the bustle. The consumer 
culture of industrial modernity merely emphasized the economic subtext of 
such practices. In the 1920s, writes Stuart Ewen, advertising educated 
American women “to look at themselves as things to be created competitively 
against other women: painted and sculpted with the aids of the modern 
market” (180).
In The Beauty Mvth: How Images of Beauty Are Used against Women. 
Naomi Wolf indicts the unattainable ideal promulgated by the beauty 
industry -  a pernicious fantasy that has made crash dieting, eating disorders, 
cosmetic surgery, and the onset of a chronic self-loathing rites of passage for 
too many American women. In cyberculture, notes Wolf, digital systems have 
enabled the creation of truly posthuman paragons of beauty: the impossibly 
flawless models in ads and fashion layouts in women’s magazines exist only 
as digitized photos, retouched with computer graphics software. 
“Airbrushing age from women’s faces is routine” even in general interest 
publications, she reports, and “computer imaging... has been used for years 
in women’s magazines’ beauty advertising” to remake reality to corporate 
dictates. This issue, she contends,
is not trivial. It is about the most fundamental freedoms: the freedom 
to imagine one’s own future and to be proud of one’s own life... to 
airbrush age off a woman’s face is to erase women’s identity, power 
and history (82-3).
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At the end of The Beauty Myth. Wolf warns that women are endangered 
by their failure to understand that the Iron Maiden -  the unnecessary 
fictions about the body beautiful that cage women’s lives -  has finally been 
uncoupled from the human frame of reference. “We still believe that there is 
some point where [cosmetic] surgery is constrained by a natural limit, the 
outline of the ‘perfect’ human female,” she writes:
That is no longer true. The “ideal” has never been about the bodies of 
women, and from now on technology can allow the “ideal” to do what 
it has always sought to do: leave the female body behind altogether to 
clone its mutations in space. The human female is no longer the point 
of reference. The “ideal” has become at last fully inhuman... Fifty 
million Americans watch the Miss America pageant; in 1989 five 
contestants., were surgically reconstructed by a single Arkansas plastic 
surgeon. Women are comparing themselves and young men are 
comparing young women with a new breed that is a hybrid nonwoman 
(266-7).
Strengthening and amplifying this opinion, not only on women but on 
human in general, is the “armored cyborgs” of Hollywood, “the remnants of 
their humanity impregnable behind heavy metal hardware, speak to a 
growing sense of human irrelevance in what is, more and more, a 
technological environment” (Dery, 1996: 243). Similarly, Bukatman sees, in 
RoboCop and the Terminator, “an uneasy but consistent sense of human 
obsolescence, and at stake is the very definition of human.... [0]ur ontology 
is adrift” (1993: 20).
The reply comes from Haraway, “The cyborg is our ontology, it gives us 
our politics” (1989a: 150). Unlike RoboCop and other aggressive symbols of
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an embattled status quo, Haraway’s cyborg is the personification of the 
future untroubled by ambiguity and difference. It reestablishes the 
relationship between mechanism and organism, culture and nature, 
simulacrum and original, science fiction and social reality in a single body. A 
utopian monster, born of a “pleasure in ... potent and taboo fusions” and 
“resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity,” 
Haraway’s cyborg is a living symbol of difference -  sexual, ethnic, and 
otherwise -  that refuses to be resolved or repressed (151; 173).
When Haraway declares that we are all cyborgs, she means it both 
literally -  medicine has given birth to “couplings between organism and 
machine,” bio- and communications technologies are “recrafting our bodies” 
-and figuratively, in the sense that “we are living through a movement from 
an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system” (150; 
161; 164). In short, technology is reversing the polarities of the world we live 
in:
Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous 
the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self- 
developing and externally-designed, and many other distinctions that 
used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are 
disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert (152) .
Going back to the nineteenth century Romantics, what Haraway gives us is 
a quest for an idealized cyborg, instead of an idealized person, and for the 
escape that the Romantics foresaw from the rationalist egoism, by becoming
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one with nature, comes the bid on becoming one with technology. Haraway is 
a Neu-romancer.
Thus introducing cyberspace, technology ironically takes the blame on its 
guilt, its penitence in alienating human from his/her body, suggesting one 
more way out for human identity, one into the fantasy of the cyberspace, a 
flight off the body to repossess the bodily sensations, a dream, which will end 
with a return to consciousness which remains rooted in the physical, 
neverminding whether the physical is human or cyborg.
As we hurtle toward the millennium, poised between technological 
Rapture and social rupture, between Tomorrowland and Bladerunner, 
we would do well to remember that -  for the foreseeable future, at 
least -  we are here to stay, in these bodies, on this planet. The 
misguided hope that we will be born again as “bionic angels,” to quote 
a Mondo 2000, is a deadly misreading of the myth of Icarus. It pins 
our future to wings of wax and feathers (Dery, 1996: 9).
4.2 Merits of Schizophrenia
Reconciling the highlights of the new condition in which the identity of 
human is to be formulated, the continuous image bombardments of 
everyday life, the undiminishing presence of the machinic, together with the 
changing conception of space has made stabilizing human identity a difficult 
task to accomplish -  if not impossible. The struggle to distinguish one’s 
identity from the milieu, from the surface causes a meltdown of the self, thus
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technological imaginary becomes the screen -  no longer the Lacanian mirror 
-  in which one looks for self-perception. The urban space, which is neither 
the Debordian spectacle nor Baudrillard’s scene now, has squashed what is 
human into the binary grid of the digital, into a flattened mass, leaving no 
distance, between the surface and the individual in which to be. Everything 
is so intimate that intimacy has lost meaning, it was evacuated, like many 
other concepts that we have lost along the way. Without the distance, the 
human subject, all-too-visible in the urban space, is no longer visible in the 
milieu. “No more expenditure, consumption, performance, but instead 
regulation, well-tempered functionality, solidarity among all the elements of 
the same system, control and global management of an ensemble,” says 
Baudrillard for this new ideal. For him, our new world is one where the 
“scene” and “mirror” no longer exist; instead there is a “screen” and 
“network”. “In place of the reflexive transcendence of mirror and scene, 
there is a nonreflecting surface, an immanent surface where operations 
unfold -  the smooth operational surface of communication” (Baudrillard, 
1983:126-127).
It was on this surface that a “distance towards fantasy” was lost (Zizek 
19). With absolute transparency, absolute emergence of the apparent in the 
modern world, where, in Zizek’s words, the “truth is out there”, a room for 
fantasy became anorexic, a long and painful process which redeemed the 
subject and the distinctions that supported the subject as subject.
[The] traditional closed universe is thus in a sense more ‘open’ than 
the universe of science: it implies the gateway into the indefinite
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Beyond, while the direct global model of modern science is effectively 
‘closed’ -  that is to say, it allows for no Beyond. The universe of 
modern science, in its very ‘meaninglessness’, involves the gesture of 
‘traversing the fantasy’, of abolishing the dark spot, the domain of the 
Unexplained, which harbours fantasies and thus guarantees Meaning: 
instead, we get the meaningless mechanism (160).
This leads us back to the invisibility of cyberspace, which allows for the 
fantasy to exist, for the play of identities. For on the surface, there is no 
identification, no possibility of play. As Deleuze and Guattari engrave it, 
there is no longer an I, for every I is a multiplicity. There is no one, for every 
one is a multiplicity. If an identity is to be defined for human in this 
schizophrenic society of merges that they consider, then cyberspace must be 
the exact plateau for this identity, considering the convergence of cyberspace 
and fantasy that we have traced. Cyberspace is the plateau where each and 
every human being is given the possibility of being any “one” that they desire 
to be, by being able to choose from the multiplicity.
Operating within the framework “identity” (negative difference) versus 
undifferentiation (confusion) “leaves a body three options. Becoming 
the person it is said to be: the slow death of stable equilibrium. Opting 
out of that path, into its opposite: neurosis and eventual breakdown. 
Or shopping-to-be: Not exactly mental stability, but not quite 
breakdown either. The frenzy of the purchasable -  potential 
experienced as infinite choice between havings rather than becomings. 
Stealing away from the shopping mall on an exorbital path tangent to 
identity and undifferentiation is called “schizophrenia”. Schizophrenia 
is a breakdown into the unstable equilibrium of continuing self­
invention (Massumi 92).
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The climax of cyberspace is shopping-to-be; particularly worth examining 
is the controversial boundary between neurosis and stability, or in the case 
of cyberspace, multi-personality disorders and multi-user domains.
A study by Turlde, “Constructions and Reconstructions of the Self in 
Virtual Reality”, presented at the Third International Conference on 
Cyberspace, elaborates the subject, clarifying the way pathology answers the 
questions of shattered self-identities in the cyberspace:
The power of the [virtual medium] as a material for the projection of 
aspects of both conscious and unconscious aspects of the self suggests 
an analogy between multiple-user domains [MUDs] and 
psychotherapeutic milieus... MUDs are a context for constructions and 
reconstructions of identity; they are also a context for reflecting on old 
notions of identity itself. Through contemporary psychoanalytic theory 
which stresses the decentered subject and through the fragmented 
selves presented by the patients, psychology confronts the ways in 
which any unitary notion of identity is problematic and illusory. What 
is the self when it functions as a society? What is the self when it 
divides its labour among its constituent “alters” or “avatars”? Those 
burdened by post-traumatic dissociative syndrome [multiple 
personality disorder, MPD] suffer the question; inhabitants of MUDs 
play with it (qtd. in Stone, 1995: 59).
When we go back to the actual public space to examine the condition of 
the individual, Sennett’s account indeed demonstrates that the individual 
was locked up in plastic.
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As belief in the public domain has come to an end, the erosion of a 
sense of self-distance, and thus the difficulty of playing in adult life, 
has taken one more step. But it is an important step. ... A person 
cannot imagine playing with his environment, playing with the facts of 
his position in society, playing with his appearances to others, because 
these conditions are now part and parcel of himself. ... To lose the 
ability to play is to lose the sense that worldly conditions are plastic. 
This ability to play with social life depends on the existence of a 
dimension of society which stands apart from, at a distance from, 
intimate desire, need and identity (1977: 267).
Nevertheless, this era in Turkle’s concern, was an era of stability, it was 
an era where “stability was socially valued and culturally reinforced” (1997: 
255). In our time, health is described in terms of fluidity rather than 
stability. It comes as no surprise that people are so much into switches 
among personae. Some people thought of the identity switches to be 
“evocative objects for thinking about the self’.
This play of identities was indeed enjoyed by the inhabitants of MUDs, 
MUSHes and MOOs. One of the inhabitants explained the underlying cause 
very briefly; “Virtual communities are, among other things, the co-saturation 
of selves who have been, all their lives, saturated in isolation” (1997: 268). If 
there is any uneasiness concerning multiplicity of identities, in the 
cyberspace construct, then it must only be predicated on valuing stability, 
which is in our day a slow death. But once the standard unitary view of 
identity is abolished, there seems to be nothing wrong with the play. 
Embedded in this play are our previous investments in the body, our 
previous uneasiness with our isolated selves, and limited lives. If cyberspace
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is offering fantasy back, why not take it? If the human subject is more 
content and satisfied and more human being schizophrenic, then why not be 
schizophrenic?
Turkic concludes her book, emphasizing that we stand on the boundary 
between the real and the virtual in today’s world, drawing from 
anthropologist Victor Turner’s term -  a liminal moment. A liminal moment 
is a moment of passage when new cultural symbols and meanings can 
emerge, a time of tension, extreme reactions and great opportunity. Based 
on this view of transition, she calls the inhabitants of MUDs, “our pioneers” 
(268). This calls for the fact that cyberspace is here to stay with all its 
uncanniness, nonetheless with its gratification of human desire. If it is to be 
the new locus of human desire and fantasy, the dark spot in which to reclaim 
fantasy, then why try to avoid it?
There is no meaning without some dark spot, without some 
forbidden/impenetrable domain into which we project fantasies which 
guarantee our horizon of meaning. Perhaps this very growing 
disenchantment with our actual social world accounts for the 
fascination exerted by cyberspace: it is as if in it we again encounter a 
Limit beyond which the mysterious domain of phantasmic Otherness 
opens up, as if the screen of the interface is today’s version of the 
blank, of the unknown region in which we can locate our own Shangri- 
las or the kingdoms of She (Zizek 160).
We are almost there.
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5. CONCLUSION
The transgressional magic of the flâneur is to make the interior appear on 
the ‘wrong side’ of its bounding wall, the wrong side of the façade. Isn’t the 
screen a kind of flâneur that disintegrates the inside and outside of our 
bodies? In cyberspace, be that the simulated three dimensional virtual space, 
or the space just behind our computer screen, or the space in between two 
telephones that connect two people somewhere in between, as we 
communicate ourselves, through the screen, through the interface that we 
use, aren’t we transgressing the border that keeps our body separate, a 
separate entity; aren’t we penetrating the porous membrane, that keeps 
distinct inside from outside, outside from inside? As technology helps make 
possible this porosity, isn’t it also redefining the body and the identity that we 
have considered human as yet? Through the projection of human into this 
space of nowhere, aren’t we leaving behind the identity that we knew to 
embrace a new identity that is a hybrid of inside and outside, here and there, 
machine and human, digital and physical? Even though we are still 
embedded in physicality, we have the chances of being anywhere, being 
anything that we desire. Nothing so far, not even art, gave way to such 
fulfillment of human fantasy, of being the other, of disappearing into the
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crowd, while appearing as the same and the other at the same moment. Thus 
cyberspace is not just a new phenomenon, but also the final stage in a very 
old phenomenon, in transgressing the limits of the body which we have 
always known to be the only physical boundary to our presences. It is not that 
we don’t possess our bodies anymore, but that we have finally achieved 
establishing a new reality, where we are much more free than we have ever 
been. There, where we can have multi-personalities, is where we can achieve 
anew, ways of understanding the other once again, and therefore losing our 
communication in the way that we used to know to step into a new world of 
communication, where we can wear any ‘body’ that we had fantasized, where 
we can “assume even the body of a lobster,” to redefine what is human (Jaron 
Lanier qtd. in McFadden 45).
William Gibson opens his novel Neuromancer. with an exemplary that 
points out to a new sense, a new perception: “The sky above the port was the 
colour of television, tuned to a dead channel”. Since an image always 
announces the death of what it represents - being a prolonged postmortem on 
what will inevitably depart or disappear - there is a haunting estrangement 
between the image and reality.
And virtuality is a further death of reality, if not the evacuation of the real. 
The stabilization of identity is yet a significantly difficult achievement to 
overcome, within the domain of reality; in the “unthinkable complexity” of 
virtuality it remains only a possibility (Gibson, 1984: 28). But in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy, becoming the person that one is said to be is again the 
slow death of stable equilibrium. Thus in this new world, in the new
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definition of human, one is allowed to shop for identities, before 
schizophrenia comes the possibility of identity.
Yet in the age of the evacuated identities, where images do not refer to 
an)^hing and where the reality is already attacked by the spectacle, this 
possibility is needed since it leaves the human beings the interval in which to 
be -  the interval between the spectacle of life and the image of death.
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